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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Court Review of Agency Decision Under
Statute-Suit by Government Against Interstate
Commerce Commission
The United States as a war-time shipper by complaint before the
Interstate Commerce Commission sought recovery from certain railroads
for their failure and refusal to provide wharfage and handling services

346

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

J[Vol. 27

or an allowance in lieu thereof inasmuch as these charges were absorbed
in the line-haul rates accorded private shippers and the same rates were
exacted from the Government even though the Government had performed the services itself.' The Commission dismissed the Government's complaint whereupon the United States brought this action to set
aside the order of the Commission. 2 Under the statute3 suits to enjoin
orders of the Commission are to be brought against the United States.
The court, faced by this apparent disregard of the accepted rule that
"No person may sue himself,"'4 found no case of controversy, refused
to review the Commission order, and did not reach the merits of the
case. The anomaly of the situation was manifest when the petition
filed by the United States and the answer filed in its behalf were both
signed by the same Assistant Attorney General. Under this holding the
statute authorizing judicial review of orders of the Commission affords
no review to the United States.
Once any person has acquired standing as a party in interest in
proceedings before the Commission, he should have the right to appear
as a party in any suit brought in court involving the validity of an order
made by the Commission. 5 Even though the parties seeking review of
a Commission order were not parties in the original proceedings before
the Commission, they still may maintain a suit to enjoin, annul, or suspend a Commission order if they were "necessarily affected" or "injuriously affected. '' 7 Under these criteria enunciated by the courts,
though admittedly concerning private parties, it is evident that the
United States is a proper party to seek judicial review of the Commission's orders; the United States was a party in the original proceedings
and its interests were affected injuriously by the dismissal of its
complaint.8
Here, however, we are faced with a statutory provision that "suits
'For the Commission's report and order, and two prior reports in the same
proceeding, see United States v. Aberdeen & R. R. R., 269 I. C. C. 141 (1947),

2642 I. C. C. 683 (1946), 263 I. C. C. 303 (1945).

United States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 78 F. Supp. 580 (D. D. C.
1948) ; probable jurisdictionnoted inem., 69 Sup. Ct. 134 (1948).
8 Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., §2322, §2324 (June 25, 1948) ; revising,
28 U. S. C. §46 (1946).
"Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hines, 273 F. 774 (C. C. A. 2d 1921).

'McLean Lumber Co. v. United States, 237 F. 460 (E. D. Tenn. 1916) ; e.g.,

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. United States, 295 U. S. 476, 479 (1935) ; Balti-

more & 0. R. R. v. United States, 264 U. S. 258, 268 (1924).
'Atlantic C. L. R. R. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 194 F. 449 (Com. C.
1911).
' Diffenbaugh v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 176 F. 409 (C. C. W. D. Mo.
1910).
' While the total reparations sought by the Government are not known, one
of the original seven railroads against whom claims were filed made a compromise settlement during the proceedings before the Commission for approximately

$865,000.
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to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission shall be brought in the district court against the
United States." 9 It has been held that in a suit to stay an order of the
Commission, the United States is an indispensable party10 and as such
would be one without which the suit cannot proceed." The statute, in
effect, makes the United States and not the agency the party defendant
and charges the Department of Justice with the duty of defending Commission orders in the courts. 12 Does this statute serve to place the Government outside the pale of judicial protection when it is the party complaining of the Commission action? Essentially, the situation would be
unchanged if the agency itself were made liable to suit. The courts,
however, apparently encounter no difficulty in suits wherein the United
States or an agency thereof has sought relief from the actions of another
agency of the Government; and the agency, not the Government, is the
party defendant.
In United States v. Public Utilities Commission'3 the Government
as a customer of a public utility company sought judicial review .of
agency action with reference to the reasonableness of utility rates. The.
court specifically recognized the problem herein involved and stated:
"The United States is seeking in this case, to establish its right
to appeal-as a person or corporation affected-from an order of'
one of its own lesser creatures, an administrative agency."' 4
Nevertheless, the issue as to a suit between coordinate units of the
Government was not raised and the review was afforded.
In Interstate Commerce Commission v. Mechling,'5 Mechling, the,
Inland Waterways Corporation and the Secretary of Agriculture brought
suit to set aside the order of the Commission in the district court. The'
Commission argued that no right, existed in the Government to bring
suits against the Commission. The Supreme Court disposed of this
argument with the terse statement, "We see no error in this."' 6 The
Government urged this precedent in the present case, but the court dis' Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., §2322, §2324 (June 25, 1948) ; revising,
28 U.
S. C. §46 (1946).
20 Lambert Co. v. Baltimore & 0.
1

2 DoBE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §68
1-

R. R., 258 U. S. 377 (1922).
(1928).

Other statutes providing that suits to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend

agency orders shall be brought against the United States: COMMUNICATIONS ACT,
OF 1934, 48 STAT. 926 (1934), as amended, 48 STAT. 1093 (1934), 50 STAT. 197
(1937), 47 U. S. C. §402 (1946); PmsRHABLE AGRICULTURAL CoMMoDIms Acr,
1930, 46 STAT. 535 (1930), 7 U. S. C. §499k (1946); PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS
ACT, 42 STAT. 168 (1921), 7 U. S. C. §217 (1946); EmERGENCY RAILROAD TRANsPORTATIoN ACT, 1933, Pub. L. No. 91, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., §16 (June 16, 1933).

"8151 F. 2d 609 (App. D. C. 1945) (Public Utilities Commission of the District1 of Columbia, a federal agency).
4Id. at 610.
1-330 U. S. 567 (1947).
'Old. at 573.
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tinguished the facts and pointed out that the Secretary of Agriculture
was specifically authorized by statute to seek judicial relief. "Consequently [the court concluded], it was not a case in which the United
States was both plaintiff and defendant." 17 It is submitted that the
specific statutory authorization to sue does not change the Governmental
character of the Secretary of Agriculture as a party litigant. If the
court desired to draw a distinction between the Secretary of Agriculture
as an agent of the Government in the performance of Governmental
States, the distinction in denomifunctions and his principal, the United
18
nation is without difference in effect.
In McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,'0 the Secretary of Agriculture joined with the trucking company in a court action to set aside
an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission granting an application
for the merger and consolidation of certain trucking lines."° The Court,
however, did not mention the propriety of the suit but decided the case
on its merits. A comparable situation arose in Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Jersey City2' wherein the Economic Stabilization Director was allowed to oppose a Commission order raising railroad fares in
Jersey City. The Court again did not question the appropriateness of
the parties in the litigation.
22
Cases such as Defense Supplies Corporationv. United Lines Co.
relied on by the court in the principal case have no relevancy here. If
the decision therein sought had been rendered, it would have resulted in
a loss of funds on the part of one Governmental agency for the benefit,
not of a private party, but of another Governmental agency. The problem was essentially one of internal management which could have been
remedied by executive action. In the principal case the Government is
deprived of its remedy against parties with whom it has no connection,
and the Government as an entity is to be wholly deprived of the funds
sought by its claim for reparations.
If the court in the principal case seeks to draw a distinction between
7 United

States v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 78 F. Supp. 580, 583 (1948).

i 8 Cf. Defense Supplies Corp. v. United States Lines Co., 148 F. 2d 311 (C.C.
A. 2d 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S.746 (1945).
"The question whether the United States is a party to a controversy is not
determined by the merely nominal party on the record but by the question of the
effect of the judgment or decree which can be entered." Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
185 U. S.373, 387 (1902) ; accord, Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U. S.627 (1914);
Boeing Air Transport, Inc. v. Farley, 75 F. 2d 765 (App. D. C. 1935). Courts
will now look behind the designation of parties on the record and seek to determine
who are real parties to litigation. Mine Safety Appliance Co. v. Knox, 59 F.
1945).
Supp. 733 (D. D. C.
19321 U. S.67 (1943).
Division of the Department of Justice had opposed the action
The
Anti-Trust
20
in the proceedings before the Commission.
be S.
enjoined
sought322to U.
503 (1944).
22148 F. 2d 311 (C. C. A. 2d 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S.746 (1945).
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suits against an agency and those against the United States because the
agency attorneys would handle the defense in the first instance whereas
the Department of Justice would be charged with the responsibility in
the second instance, the distinction is fruitless. In practice the Department of Justice has on occasion admitted the allegations made by plaintiffs regarding defects in the Commission's orders whereupon the Commission has taken up the defense and the litigation has proceeded to a
conclusion. 23 In other instances the Department of Justice has failed
to take part in litigation due to conflicting allegations by coordinate
agencies of the Government and the Commission has continued the suit
to its final determination.2
Section 9 of the INTERSTATE COMMERcE ACT provides that any person or persons claiming to be damaged may either make complaint to
the Commission or bring suit in any district court of competent jurisdiction.
If the result of this decision prevails upon appeal, the Government in similar cases will be obliged to choose the alternative remedy
provided by the statute and bring suit against the individual carrier in
the district court instead of litigating before the Commission unless it
is willing to forego its right to contest the initial decision. Thus, if the
Government is relegated to the use of the federal courts for the ajudication of its claims, it will be deprived of the expert technical ability of
the Commission.
It is submitted that the interest of the Commission as defended by
the United States is not that of a party litigant which stands to gain
or lose by the outcome of the suit. While it is true that the Commission
has an interest in the integrity of its orders, the court's decision would
in no manner result in the imposition on the Commission of pecuniary
liability. The individual railroads, in the final analysis, are the actual
parties to be pecuniarily affected by the present decision. The fact that
the Commission has been the trial tribunal should not result in one of
the parties in interest before it being precluded from contesting the suit.
Once the Interstate Commerce Commission has ruled on a case coming before it, there remains only the course pursued by the Government
" Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Mechling, 330 U. S. 567 (1947) (United
States admitted allegations of complaint in district court, whereupon I. C. C. intervened and defended the order.) ; McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U. S.
67 (1943)
(United States confessed error before district court and I. C. C.

defended.).

, Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Jersey City, 322 U. S. 503 (1944)

(United

States was named a defendant but filed a neutral answer because two Government
agencies were in opposition to each other.) ; Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Inland
Waterways Corp., 319 U. S. 671 (1943)

(Attorney General' did not participate,

giving as his reason the existence of a conflict in litigation between coordinate
agencies of the Government, the A. A. A. and the I. C. C.).
1124 STAT. 382 (1887), as amended, 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 49 STAT. 543

(1935), 49 U. S. C. §9 (1946).
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This means
in the principal case to enjoin the Commission's order.
that the Government is without remedy in its present action whereas the
railroads in a Commission ruling adverse to their interests would have
been able to have brought the case before the district court for review
of the Commission ruling- 7
"The Government is always at liberty . . . to avail itself of all the
remedies which the law allows to every person, natural or artificial, for
the vindication and assertion of its rights."' 2 And yet the decision in
the principal case provides a judicial cloak behind which private interests
may seek immunity from judicial review sought by the Government of
decisions favorable to those private interests.
ROBERT D. LARSEN.
Automobiles-Repurchase Option Contracts-Enforceability
Thereof
To combat the practice of quick resale to a "used car" lot, where
today's demand permits new motor vehicles to be sold far above their
original price, many dealers have employed a repurchase option contract.
These provide that, if during the life of the agreement (usually six
months) the purchaser \vishes to sell the car, he will give the first refusal to the dealer for a fixed or determinable price. In addition, some
contracts stipulate that for failure to perform, a certain sum shall be
paid as liquidated damages.,
In any suit to enforce' such a contract the defense that the law does
not favor restrictions deterring the sale of chattels must be met. But
in light of the present situation in the automobile market, there should
be -astrong public policy in favor of these contracts as a device for
cutting the price of "used cars" by accelerating delivery to legitimate
purchasers.
Another problem present in all these contracts is that of consideration. The contract states that it is a part of the consideration for the
sale of the car, and this interpretation has been upheld.1 A close analogy
to the contracts in questions may be found in similar transactions relating
to corporate stock. In such a situation the Massachusetts court 2 said that
the consideration was the purchase price plus the agreement to offer the
"' Lambert Co. v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 258 U. S. 377 (1922) ; North Dakota
v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 257 U. S. 485, 490 (1922) ("Complete justice requires
that the railroads not be subjected to the risk of two irreconcilable commandsthat of the I. C. C. enforced by a decree on the one side and that of this court

on the other.").
27 Cf. United States v. Griffin, 303 U. S. 226 (1938).
2
United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 222 (1882).
'Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co., 76 Ga. App. 570, 46 S. E. 2d 611 (1948).
(1894).
- New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass. 148, 38 N. E. 432
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stock to the company if a sale were contemplated. In this respect a
seller's agreement to repurchase is the same as his option to repurchase
insofar as the duty upon the buyer is concerned, for in either case he
is bound to offer before selling elsewhere; therefore the rulings of such
cases are authority here. These cases uniformly say that such agreements are valid terms of the sale, supported by its consideration, and
that the claim of lack of mutuality of obligation is not a defense.3
For the equitable enforcement of these contracts there are three
theories: specific performance, rescission for fraud, and equitable servitude. To succeed on the first theory the dealer must overcome the
barrier that specific performance is not usually granted in personal property contracts unless the remedy at law is inadequate. 4 To show inadequacy he can plead injury to his good will and reputation in that.
if his cars are seen on "used car"' lots, people will say that he is not
careful to whom he sells, which in turn may lead to repercussions from
national headquarters. A resale may result in damage actually impossible to ascertain, for dealers usually have repair and servicing shops
from which a large part of their income is derived, and they have reason
to expect that most cars kept in the hands of the purchaser will be
returned to them for some later work. Furthermore, under a policy.
directed toward eliminating such resales, damages would not be as,
efficient a remedy.
A second theory that the. dealer might pursue is rescission of
the sale for fraudulent intent not to abide by this repurchase contract
when the sale was made. Unless there were witnesses to testify as to
the purchaser's intention, the proof of it would have to be circumstantial, in which case it would be strongest ivhen the resale was made
within a few days.
A third equitable theory would be that of a servitude. But since it
is seldom recognized for personal property 5 and its use here would add
nothing that could not be accomplished by specific performance, it is
not recommended. Furthermore, the purpose of this doctrine seems to
be to force holders of the chattel who were not in privity with the original contract to comply with the servitude, while in the situation in
question the objective of the dealer is to keep the chattel from being
transferred from the first purchaser; therefore it appears that this is not
the type of problem for which the equitable servitude theory was
intended.
'46 Am. JUR., Sales §509; see Note, 60 A. L. R. 215, 232 (1929).
, As to the adequacy of damages in suits on dealer's contracts to sell new cars
see Note, 62 HAnv. L. Rlv. 149 (1949), and Simpson, Equity in 1947 ANN. SUR.
Am. LAw 811 (1948).
'Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928):;
Baer, Performer'sRight to Enjoin Unlicensed Broadcasts of Recorded Renditions,
19 N. C. L. Ray. 202, 205 (1941).
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Present in the enforcement by any one of these theories is the
problem of giving notice of the contract to any third party who might
buy the car. Since in the majority of cases the car will already have
been resold when the dealer learns of it, notice is necessary to prevent
a bona fide purchaser from cutting off the equitable remedies. This
could usually be accomplished by writing on the title that such a contract had been made relating to this automobile. Even though there
may be no place reserved on the title for this entry, there seems to be
no legal objection to putting such a notation on the certificate. If in
seeking one of these remedies adequate notice has not been provided for
third party purchasers, the dealer, under the theory that the purchaser
was threatening to sell, would have to take steps to restrain a resale
before it was made.6 To avoid the question of notice the dealer could
retain the title for six months, but for reasons of salesmanship and
future good will it does not appear feasible.
In regard to the effectiveness in North Carolina of notice of this
contract being placed on the certificate of title, the rules laid down in
CarolinaDiscount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 7 that the sale of an automobile without the transfer of title is valid and that the protection for
mortgagees is in recordation, are broad enough to cover the issue here.8
Although the certificate ordinarily would pass on sale, it does not have
to, hence notice on it would not be a complete safeguard; but it seems
that if the contract were put on record as a lien the requisite notice
would have been given.
In lieu of or after failure of other remedies directed toward the
return of the chattel itself, the dealer can seek the legal remedy of damages for the breach of the contract between the parties. In proving his
damages the dealer's ethical problem may appear delicate for he must
show the price that he could have realized had he resold it as a "used
car" or had he, instead of the defendant, sold the car to a "used car"
dealer. Legally, however, there is no restriction on the price at which
a "used car" may be sold. Furthermore, if such profits were to be
made, the contract stipulated who was to receive them and should be
binding on the parties. If his contract is one of those which contains a
provision for liquidated damages, the dealer need only plead the contract
as it stands, leaving the burden of proof on the defendant to show that
8 The defendant could be subjected to contempt proceedings if he did not obey
the restraining order.
7190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414 (1925).
' The court held that the statutes governing transfer and registration of titles
for automobiles [N. C. GEN. STAT. §§20-50, 72, 74 (1943)] did not replace the
recordation law for mortgages, liens, and encumbrances. They distinguished the
North Carolina statutes from those of other states which read that the sale without transfer of title is invalid or void.
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the damages are such as to be a penalty. 9 Even though under such a
10
contract the dealer is not required to prove his actual damage, it
would be safer to do so and to show that it was difficult to estimate the
amount accurately when the contract was drawn.
In the two cases now reported involving the enforcement of these
contracts, it has not been necessary for the courts to pass directly on the
main issues. In LarsonBuick Co. v. Mosca"- the facts disclosed obvious
fraud and the resale had been enjoined before an innocent purchaser intervened. In Schuler v. Dearing Chevrolet Co. 2 the purchaser's demurrer was sustained because the company's pleadings did not show that it
had been damaged. However, from an over-all survey it appears that
the first problem is whether such contracts will be recognized at all by
the courts, to which it is submitted that in light of the present situation
in the automobile business they are highly desirable. The second problem, notice to the third party who buys from the original purchaser,
can be met by a notation on the title where it must be transferred as
part of a sale or by recordation of the contract in states like North
Carolina which do not make this requirement.
The solution most advantageous to the dealer would be a repurchase
contract which had its liquidated damages secured by a non-negotiable
note and a recorded chattel mortgage. Since this note and mortgage
would take effect only in event of a breach, they cannot be attacked as
a promise to pay more than the regular purchase price for the car.
Such a contract would deter reselling for it is not likely that a "used
car" dealer would want a vehicle with a mortgage against it which
must be paid to perfect the title. It would also give the notice necessary for the use of an equitable remedy and protect against a breach by
an insolvent person. The majority of states recognize comity for
recordation, therefore a chattel mortgage properly recorded would be
constructive notice to a purchaser outside the state. 13
MARSHALL T.

SPEARS, JR.

Constitutional Law-Declaratory Judgment-Remedy
in Federal Constitutional Cases
The basic accomplishment of proceeding by declaratory judgment
is "that it enables the point in dispute to be raised at the inception of
the controversy, before damage has been done by acting upon one's own
§157 (1935); Pace v. Z'ellmer, 194 Iowa 516, 186
1" If the court took judicial notice of the prevailing situation with regard to
"used cars," the opposition's claim of penalty would be met; if not, the better probe to show the situation to rebut the claim.
cedure would
1179 N. Y. S. 2d 654 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
1276 Ga. App. 570, 46 S.E. 2d 611 (1948).
a'10 Ams. JUR., Chattel Mortgages §21; see Note, 57 A. L. R. 702, 711 (1928).
'McCoRmicK,

N. W. 420 (1922).
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view of his rights ....
1 In the field of constitutional law this accomplishment has various facets:
1. Plaintiff can prevent uncertainty and insecurity in personal and
business transactions without waiting until the damage has been
2
done.
2. Plaintiff can proceed on his own initiative to obtain a declaration
of his constitutional rights. 3
3. Plaintiff can avoid the dilemma of making a choice, based on his
judgment of constitutionality, either of complying with a statute
and its restrictions, which may be unconstitutional all the while,
or of refusing to obey the statute and thereby subjecting himself
to its penalties if it later proves to be constitutional. 4
4. Plaintiff need seek no coercive relief in order to obtain an adjudication of his constitutional rights.5
5. Plaintiff can avoid circuity of action and multiple litigation in'
many cases by a single declaration of constitutionality. 6
6. Plaintiff can pursue his action to a speedier conclusion.7 '
7. Also, plaintiff sho'ld not have to show that there is impending
irreparable injury8 or that his remedy at law is inadequate.0
In view of the extensive and seemingly successful utilization of the
declaratory judgment in other jurisdictions,10 Congress passed the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act,"1 and apparently intended that .the
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 55 (2d ed. 1941).
"Under the present law you take a step in the dark and then turn on the
light to see if you stepped into a hole. Under the declaratory judgment law you
turn on the light and then take the step." Representative Ralph Gilbert in 69
CONG. REc. 2108 (1928).
3 "It is true that (the plaintiffs) might translate their claims into actions, and
await prosecutions, but that is precisely the dilemma from which (the declaratory
judgment) was designed to afford relief." Faulkner v. Keene, 85 N. H. 147, 155,
155 Atl. 195, 200 (1931).
""Either course was fraught with danger. To afford relief to parties in such
a situation is the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgments Act." Acme Finance
Co. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 108, 73 Pac. 2d 341, 346 (1937).
'UNIFORM
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT §1; 48 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. §400
(1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1027 (1935), 28 U. S. C. §400 (1946).
'Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288 (1936),
aff'd, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. 2d 385 (1936).
" "The court may order a speedy hearing of an action for declaratory judgment and may advdnce it on the calendar." FED. R. Crv. P., 57.
8 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933) so held, but
later cases have indicated a tendency to the contrary as will be shown.
' "The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." FED. R. Civ. P., 57.
"°UNIFoRm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT is now adopted substantially in
thirty-two states; see also New Zealand Declaratory Judgments Act, 1908, 8 Edw.
VII, No. 220; Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N. W. 62 (1940) (statute
regulating religious activities) ; Edgerton v. Hood, 205 N. C. 816, 172 S. E. 481
(1934) (banking statute).
148 STAT. 955, 28 U. S. C. §400 (1934), as amended, 49 STAT. 1027 (1935),
28 U. S. C. §400 (1946).
'BORCHARD,
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full advantage of this new procedure should inure to the benefit of
12
federal constitutional litigants.
But the federal judiciary has found difficulty envisaging the declaratory judgment as a proper remedy in many constitutional cases. Before
the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act was passed the Supreme Court
had apparently waged a campaign through its decisions to avert enactment, by continued reference to the declaratory judgment as a mere
advisory opinion.' 3 A drastic change occurred in Nashville, C. & St.
L. Ry. v. Wallace,14 arising under the Tennessee Declaratory Judgments
Act, when the Court accepted as valid the distinction between an advisory opinion and a declaration of constitutional rights in a real and
substantial controversy. However, a year later in 1934 the Court said,
"This court may not be called on to give advisory opinions or to pronounce declaratory judgments."' 5 But later the Supreme Court in
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth'6 held the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act constitutional and declaratory relief appropriate where there
is an actual controversy, even though the litigant be in no position to
seek coercive relief and suffers no irreparable injury. However, since
the Haworth case it has become increasingly apparent that the federal
judiciary, in line with its earlier attitude, is still reluctant to grant
7
declaratory judgments as to constitutional issues.'
The reason most often advanced by the Supreme Court in denying
declarations of constitutionality is "no case or controversy," based on
the old conception of the declaratory judgment as a mere advisory opinion. A labor union sued under a state declaratory judgment act for a
declaration that a statute regulating the union as to strikes and pickets,
and subjecting union officials to possible imprisonment if violated, was
unconstitutional. Held: that since the plaintiff had not violated the
statute, there was no justiciable controversy, no concrete factual basis
for a decision.' 8 The union and its officers were thereby forced to
violate statutory regulations in order to test the constitutionality of the
statute, subjecting themselves to fines and possible imprisonment. 19
Similarly the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
2

Sen. Rep. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 3; H. R. Rep. No. 1264, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. 2.
"Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass'n, 277 U. S. 274 (1928) ; Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70 (1927); Note, Declaratory Relief in the
Supreme Court, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1932).
24288 U. S. 249 (1933).
'
Alabama v. Arizona, 291 U. S. 286, 291 (1934).
300 U. S.277 (1937).
17 See Comment, Declaratory Judgments in. Federal Courts, 41 YALE L. J. 1195
(1932) in reply to Note, Declaratory Relief in the Supremne Court, 45 HARv. L.
REv. 1089 (1932).
" Alabama State Fed. of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U. S. 450 (1945). The effect
of a state court decision was used as a secondary basis for the decision.
" Contra: Dill v. Hamilton, 137 Neb. 723, 291 N. W. 62 (1940).
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there was no case or controversy where plaintiff sued for a declaration
that the Arizona Train Limit Law was unconstitutional, alleging that
penalties for violation would cost plaintiff $1,600 to $37,000 per day,
while losses in freight if it obeyed would amount to not less than
$300,000 per year.20 The court held that since there had been no violation, there was no controversy. The court failed to perceive that until
its constitutionality was declared, the statute was a real threat to plain2
tiff, leaving his legal and financial position in a state of suspension.
Even where the SEC sought to enforce the no-mail penalties for failure
to register under the Public Utilities Holding Company Act and defendant asked by counterclaim for a declaratory judgment that the Act
was unconstitutional, it was held that defendant had no case or controversy because it had not registered under the Act.22 Thus defendant
was compelled either to register under the Act in order to contest the
validity of any part thereof, or refuse to subject itself to rigorous controls by registering and thereby lose United States mail privileges.23
One of the most flagrant violations of the spirit and intent of declaratory
judgment legislation is the case of United Public Workers v. MitchellA
where the Supreme Court held that civil service employees who desired
to participate in political activities forbidden under the Hatch Act had
no justiciable controversy as to the constitutionality of the Act until
they had actually violated the Act and thereby subjected themselves to
possible dismissal from governmental service with simultaneous loss of
seniority. Justice Douglas, dissenting in part, presented the more realistic viewpoint :2
"Declaratory relief is the singular remedy available here to preserve the status quo while the constitutional rights of these appellants to make these utterances and to engage in these activities
are determined. The threat against them is real not fanciful,
immediate not remote. The case is therefore an actual not a
hypothetical one."
It is submitted that each of the above cases involved justiciable con20

Southern Pac. Co. v. Conway, 115 F. 2d 746 (C. C. A. 9th 1940).
Contra: ". . the mere continued existence of article 88 under the color of
right and authority constitutes a continuing threat to collect, exact, and enforce
the tax." Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. City of New York, 287 N. Y. Supp. 288,
aff'd, 272 N. Y. 668, 5 N. E. 2d 385 (1936).
Even though
2 Electric Bond and Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U. S. 419 (1938).
the suit was to enforce the no-mail penalties of the statute, the Court said of the
counterclaim, "It presents a variety of hypothetical controversies which may never
become
real." Mr. justice McReynolds dissented without opinion.
2
But cf. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936) in which the more
21

limited injunction was granted, although the provision of the statute held to render

it unconstitutional was not even shown to be involved in plaintiff's case.
24330 U. S. 75 (1947); see Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial
Declaratory Judgment, 16 MrcH. L. REV. 69 (1917).
Rights-The
22330 U. S. 75, 119 (1947).
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troversies well within the limits of the declaratory remedy. It is difficult to appraise these decisions without concluding that the test of
justiciability was more rigidly applied by 2the federal courts because the
remedy sought was declaratory judgment.
Increasingly apparent in Supreme Court decisions is a failure to distinguish the declaratory judgment from injunction. There seems to be
a concerted attempt by the Supreme Court to restrict the use of declaratory relief in constitutional cases to the area already covered by injunction, requiring irreparable injury with no other adequate remedy.
Although the declaratory judgment is closely related to equitable actions,
it is not exclusively an equitable remedy, but a remedy sui generis,
applicable in both law and equity.27 Under the Federal Rules, the availability of declaratory relief is by express provision iwt dependent on
the inadequacy of other remedy.2
Yet in two recent cases involving the constitutionality of statutes,
where declaratory judgment and injunction were jointly sought, the Court
based much of its reasoning in throwing out the declaratory judgment,
as well as the injunction, on adequacy of remedy at law.29 Such reasoning was applicable to the injunction only,3 0 the court overlooking the
fact that there are many instances in which declaratory relief is appro31
priate where the technical prerequisites for injunction are not found.
The Supreme Court has in one instance misrepresented the import of
its former words as to the necessity for showing threatened irreparable
injury in a declaratory judgment action. In deciding in Nashville, C. &
S. L. Ry. v. Wallace that irreparable injury was not necessary, injunction not being involved, the Court said 32
"Thus the narrow question presented for determination is whether
the controversy before us, which would be justiciable in this
" See Note, 25 N. C. L. REV. 436 (1947).
" Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931);
BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 239 (2d ed. 1941).
2" See note 9 supra.
"Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U. S. 752 (1947) (exhaustion of administrative remdedy was involved) ; Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323

U. S. 316 (1945).

20 "We see no reason why the statute (declaratory judgment statute) should
not, we think it should, be given the prophylactic scope to which its language,
in the light of its purpose, extends, under its disputants as to whose right there
is actual controversy, may obtain a binding judicial declaration as to them, before
damage has actually been suffered, and without having to make the showing of
irreparable injury and the law's inadequacy required for the granting of ordinary
preventive relief in equity." Gully v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 82 F. 2d 145,
149 (1936), cert. denied, 298 U. S. 688 (1936).
1 "Its (the declaratory judgment's) purpose is to obtain a judicial determination of legal relations that are uncertain and the subject of dispute, and to avoid
. .. occasions for injunctive relief." 3 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAcTic:E §57.02 (1st ed.

1938) ; Borchard, Tlw Next Step Beyond Equit3-The Declaratory Action, 13
U. OF CHl. L. REv. 145 (1946). [Italics added to quotation.]
S. 249, 262 (1933).
.2288

U.

358

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Court if presented in a suit for injunction, is any less so because
through a modified procedure (declaratory judgment) appellant
has been permitted to present it . . . without praying for an in-

junction or alleging that irreparable injury will result. ..."
But in Colgrove v. Green, a 1946 case, one portion of this statement
was lifted from its context and quoted thus :3
".. . the test for determining whether a federal court has
authority to make a declaration . . . is whether the controversy

'would be justiciable in this court if presented in suit for in-

junction.' . .."
Clearly this is a direct misrepresentation of the Nashville decision
which held no irreparable injury was necessary if only declaratory judgment were sought. The same year of the Colegrove case, Justice Rutledge dissented in Cook v. Fortson, feeling that both the Colegrove case
and the Cook case should be reheard together. He explained his reasons
in a footnote. 4
"It was to avoid the limitations resulting from the fact that injunctive or other immediately effective equitable relief could not be
given that relief by way of declaratory judgment was authorized
by Congress. This Court has not yet determined that declaratory
relief cannot be given beyond the boundaries fixed by the preexisting jurisdiction in equity ......
A 1948 decision of the Supreme Court indicates that the majority
of the Court now regard the declaratory judgment as an action requiring the equity prerequisites, if not an actual action in equity.3 5
The Court has been confronted in many declaratory judgment cases
with adversative conditions more drastic than those in earlier cases
where the supposedly more restricted injunction was upheld,3 6 but has
failed to perceive in many instances the potentialities of the declaratory
-328 U. S. 549, 552 (1946). The opinion of the Court was supported by
only three Justices, Frankfurter, who wrote the opinion, Reed, and Burton. Justice Jackson took no part in the case. Justice Rutledge concurred only in result.
Justice Black dissented and was joined by Justices.Douglas and Murphy. [Italics
added.]
,329 U. S. 675, 677 (1946). However, the appeal was dismissed per curiam
over the opinion of Justice Rutledge.
" "But as we have seen, the Bank's grievance here is too remote and insubstantial, too speculative in nature, to justify an injunction against the Board of
Governors, and therefore equally inappropriatefor a declaration of rights." Eccles
v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Village, Cal., 68 Sup. Ct. 641 (1948). Justice Reed,
dissenting, with whom Justice Burton joined, felt that the case should be heard
on its merits, saying, "If governmental power is being unlawfully used to constrain respondent's operation of its business, respondent is entitled to protection
now." [Italics added.]
8 Compare three earlier injunction cases, where, although a statute was either
not yet applied to plaintiff or not yet even in force, the Court heard the cases on
their merits, saying that there was an actual controversy. Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S.365 (1926) ; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S.
510 (1925); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S.197 (1923).
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judgment in allowing unconstitutional legislation to be quickly and
effectively contested before irretrievable loss has occurred. It is submitted that the Supreme Court could properly allow the declaratory
judgment a more liberal application in federal constitutional litigation,
consonant with its status and intended use, without being forced to
37
decide any hypothetical cases based on insufficient facts.
RALPH M. STOCKTON, JR.

Eminent Domain-Hydroelectric Adaptability as Element of Just
Compensation-Effect of Federal Power Act
'
The Constitutional provisions' for payment of "just compensation
for land taken by means of eminent domain proceedings have generally
been regarded as securing to the owner the market value of the land
considering its best possible future use, i.e., the price which would be
agreed upon at a voluntary sale between an owner willing to sell and
a purchaser willing to buy.2 This general rule is applied where dam
sites are condemned, 3 but a complicating factor arises when the owner
claims the special adaptability of his land for hydroelectric development
as an element of value. This special adaptability has generally been
allowed as a factor to be considered where a reasonable possibility of
connection with the other required tracts has caused purchasers in the
open market to take hydroelectric possibilities into account, quite apart
from the needs of the condemnor. 4 The tendency has been in the direction of a more strict application of this rule so as to eliminate any
consideration of dam site adaptability where it appears that combination
of the tracts by open market purchases is not reasonably probable. 5
""If the remedy through a declaratory judgment does not at least in part
fill the gap between law and equity there would be little purpose in enacting the
statutes providing for such procedure." Schaefer v. First Nat. Bank of Findlay,
134 Ohio St. 511, 518, 18 N. E. 2d 263, 267 (1938).
'U. S. CoNsT. AMEND. V; AMEND. XIV requires the states to provide just
compensation for private property taken. Most state constitutions have such a
provision. Lenhoff, Development of the Concept of Eninent Domain, 42 COL. L.
REv. 596 (1942) ; McKean, ConstitutionalLimitations Upon the Power of Eminent
Domain, 6 RocKy MT. L. REv. 16 (1933); Recent Cases, 7 U. oF CHI. L. REv.
166 2 (1939).
BAUER, ESSENTIALS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 427 (1919) ; FIELD, THE LAW
OF DAMAGES §846 (1876); II LEWIS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE
UNITED SA ATS §478 (2d ed. 1900); III SEDG-,WICK, DAMAGES §1171 (9th ed.
1920); IV SUTHERLAND, THE LAW OF DAMAGES §1064 (4th ed. 1916).
'See Note, 106 A. L. R. 955 (1937).
' McCandless v. United States, 298 U. S. 342 (1936), reversing 74 F. 2d 596
(C. C. A. 9th 1935); Ford Hydroelectric Co. v. Neely, 13 F. 2d 361 (C. C. A.
7th 1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 723 (1926) ; accord, Mississippi and Rum River
Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403 (1878). See Notes, 124 A. L. R. 910 (1940),
106 5A. L. R. 955 (1937) ; Note, 2 WASH. L. REv. 192 (1927).
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246 (1934), affirming 67 F. 2d 24 (C. C. A.
8th 1933) ; accord, North Kansas City Development Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R.
Co., 147 F. 2d 161 (C. C. A. 8th 1945), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 867 (1945);
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For compensation to be allowed for the land's special adaptability
for hydroelectric development, the use of the property for power purposes must have been reasonably probable without the use of eminent
domain to obtain the other tracts necessary for the dam and reservoir.0
This last rule has limited the possibility of considering such special
adaptability in assessing just compensation, since the typical situation
is one where many tracts must be acquired for such a project, the result
being that the special adaptability is of no value to a hypothetical market
that has no power of eminent domain in order to effect such combination.7 If the condemnor is the United States and the likelihood of combining the land of the condemnee with necessary land of others by
purchase is too remote to affect market value, the fact that the condemnee actually has the power of eminent domain from a state and might
thereby acquire the other tracts will not be considered in determining
whether there is a reasonable possibility of the condemnee's land being
8
combined with other tracts necessary for a power development.
In the case which established this refinement, it was stipulated that
the stream concerned was non-navigable. Where the stream is navigable, the effect of the commerce clause of the United States Constitution must be considered if the United States is the condemnor. Resting
on the argument that a private riparian owner has no property right in
the water power of a navigable stream, the rule seems well established
that the United States need not pay compensation for dam site adaptabilBaetjer v. United States, 143 F. 2d 391 (C. C. A. 1st 1944), cert. denied, 323 U. S.
772 (1944); United States v. Boston, C. C. and N. Y. Canal Co., 271 Fed. 877
(C. C. A. 1st 1921). Dolan, Present Day Court Practice in Condemnation Suits,
31 VA. L. REv. 9 (1944) ; Note, 35 HARv. L. REv. 76 (1921) ; Comment, 26 TEX.
L. REv. 199 (1947).
6 McCoRmIcI, LAW OF DAMAGES §129 (1935); Developnents in the LawDamages, 61 HARv. L. REv. 113 (1947).

'New York v. Sage, 239 U. S. 57 (1915), reversing In re Bensel, 206 Fed.
369 (C. C. A. 2d 1913) ; McGovern v. New York, 229 U. S. 363 (1913) ; Medina
Valley Irr. Co. v. Seekatz, 237 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 5th 1916) ; Note, 44 YALE
L. J. 1095 (1935). N. C. follows these principles regarding special adaptability
value. Nantahala Power and Light Co. v. Moss, 220 N. C. 200, 17 S. E. 2d 10
(1941).
'United States ex re. and for the Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v.
Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943), reversing 118 F. 2d 79 (C. C. A. 4th 1941),
wdifying T. V. A. v. Southern States Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 519 (W. D. N. C.
1940), mandate conformed to, 138 F. 2d 343 (C. C. A. 4th 1943), cert. denied,
321 U. S. 773 (1944). This case extends the rule that dam site value need not
be compensated for (1) where the likelihood of combining the necessary tracts
is too remote to affect market value, or (2) it could only be done by one armed
with a power of eminent domain. Simply stated, the extension is that even though
the condemnee has a power of eminent domain granted by a state, this will not
be considered as bearing on the matter of reasonable possibility of combining the
necessary tracts where the land is taken through the exercise of Federal eminent
domain powers. It is significant, however, that Parker, J., refused to allow the
condemnee's land to be valued solely on the basis of small separated tracts of wild
mountain land in conforming to the higher Court's mandate. Notes, 38 ILL. L.
REv. 218 (1943), 18 TENN. L. Rav. 300 (1944).
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ity value," the rights and relations being fixed by the adoption of the
Constitution."0
Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro" presented for the
first time the question of whether a licensee of the Federal Power Commission acquired by reason of its license -any of the Federal Government's immunity from liability for the payment of compensation based
on hydroelectric adaptability when condemning a dam site on a navigable
stream. Grand-Hydro, a private corporation, had been granted a franchise and eminent domain powers by the State of Oklahoma for devel6pment of hydroelectric power on the Grand River. Several years later,
the state legislature created the Grand River Dam Authority, a conservation and reclamation district, for hydroelectric development of the
Grand River Basin.12 Grand-Hydro owned the land constituting the
Pensacola dam site which GRDA condemned in an action brought in
the state courts. GRDA maintained that no evidence of value as a dam
site should be admitted for several reasons based on local law, but all
these were decided against GRDA. The contention that since GRDA
had a license from the Federal Power Commission and Grand-Hydro
did not, GRDA was the only agency which could legally build a dam
at the site concerned and should not have to pay Grand-Hydro for a
value the latter could not legally enjoy was also rejected. 13 On appeal,
'United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53 (1913);
Washington Water Power Co. v. United States, 135 F. 2d 541 (C. C. A. 9th
1943), modifying 41 F. Supp. 119 (E. D. Wash. 1941), cert. denied, 320 U. S.
747 (1943); Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (C. C. A. 9th
1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 715 (1937) ; United States v. West Virginia Power
Co., 56 F. Supp. 298 (S. D. W. Va. 1944); accord, United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311 U. S. 377 (1940), reversing, 107 F. 2d 769 (C. C. A.
4th 1939).
10

Continental Land Co. v. United States, 88 F. 2d 104 (C. C. A. 9th 1937),

cert.169
denied,
715 (1937).
Sup.302
Ct. U.
114S.(1948),
affirming, 201 P. 2d 225 (Okla. 1947).
12

QKLA. STAT. ANNOTATED, tit. 82 §§861-881. The statutory grant of power
to exercise a power of eminent domain read as follows: "To acquire by condemnation any and all property of any kind, real, personal, or mixed, or any
interest therein within or without the boundaries of the District necessary or convenient to the exercise of the powers, rights, privileges and functions conferred
upon it by this Act, in the manner provided by general law with respect to condemnation." OxLA. STAT. ANNOTATFD, tit. 82 §862(f) (Supp. 1948). The general law referred to is OKLA. STAT. ANNOTATED, tit. 66 §§51-63 (1937). In North
Carolina, N. C. GEN. STAT. §§56-1 to 56-10 (1943) grants eminent domain powers
to power companies with the proceedings for condemnation to be as set out in
N. C. GEN. STAT. §§40-11 to 40-29 (1943). Apparently, the general condemnation
procedure in both states was designed originally for railroads.
" Grand-Hydro v. Grand River Dam Authority, 192 Okla. 693, 139 P. 2d 798
(1943) reversed the lower court which had excluded evidence of dam site value.
That the Oklahoma Court did not reach this decision without considerable difficulty is attested to by a decision affirming the judgment which was subsequently
withdrawn: 130 P. 2d 311 (advance sheets only, as decision withdrawn before
bound volume 130 P. 2d published). The second trial resulted in a judgment in
favor of Grand-Hydro for full dam-site value and was affirmed by the state court.
Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 201 P. 2d 225 (Okla. 1947), cert.
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the United States Supreme Court affirmed 5-4 without deciding this
vital federal question.
The Court was content to let the Oklahoma decision stand that such
a federal license was not necessary on the part of Grand-Hydro in
order for the evidence of dam site value to be considered.1 4 This result
was based on the following: (1) the petition for condemnation made
no reference to the Federal Power Act or rights claimed thereunder;
and (2) the Federal Power Act had merely attached conditions to the
use of the land for a power site rather than rendering the site valueless
to an owner for that purpose. The state law as to measure of compensatiorg, consequently, was held to be unaffected by the Act.
The first point is narrow for a decision of such public significance.
The second seems contrary to the plain language of the Federal Power
Act,' 5 for it certainly seems to have rendered a power site valueless for
power uses insofar as a non-licensee owner is concerned.' 0 The issue
of whether a licensee of the FPC has the rights of the United States in
the waters of the flowing stream under the commerce clause is not
decided.
The history of the Federal Power Act and the earlier Federal Water
Power Act is one of an attempt to preserve the water power in a navigable stream for the public, rejecting the idea of private ownership of
the power in a navigable stream.17 There is authority that such water
denied, 332 U. S. 841 (1947), cert. granted, 333 U. S. 852 (1948), aff'd, 69 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1948).

In July, 1939, the Federal Power Commission had granted a license to GRDA
on the basis of a finding that the proposed construction would affect interstate
commerce because of its effect on the Arkansas River, a navigable stream.
"4The assumption that there could be two valid outstanding FPC licenses to
diff6rent parties covering the same site has no foundation in the Federal Power
Act.
r41 STAT. 1063, as amended, 49 STAT. 838, 16 U. S. C. §§791a-825r (1946).
"sSince the condemning party already has a license, the present owner is powerless to get one. Should he or any grantee other than the licensee attempt to
develop the site, it seems that 16 U. S. C. §817 (1941) would be violated: "It shall
be unlawful for any person, State, or municipality, for the purpose of developing
electric power, to construct, operate, or maintain any dam, water conduit, reservoir, power house, or other works incidental thereto across, along, or in any of
the navigable waters of the United States . . .except under and in accordance
with the terms of a ... license granted pursuant to this chapter."
Though the Oklahoma Court relied to some extent on the fact that the Federal
Power Commission found that the GRDA came under the Act because the Grand
River dam affected interstate commerce rather than because it was a navigable
stream, the United States Supreme Court decision does not rest on this distinction.
Apparently, federal regulation and control apply equally in the two situations.
See Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U. S.508, 525 (1941) ;
Gatchell, The Role of the Federal Power Commission in Regional Development,

32 IowA L. REv. 283 (1947).

7 Fly, The Role of the Federal Government in the Conservation of Water Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274 (1938); Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective
Federal Water Power Legislation, 14 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 9 (1945); Scott, Is
Federal Control of Water Power Development Inconsistent With State Interests,
9 GEo. WAsH. L. Rav. 631 (1941); Comment, 39 MicH. L. REv. 976 (1941). For
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in a navigable stream is not property at all, but if anyone has a property
interest it would seem to be the public for public uses.18 Thus, it does
not follow that a private owner of land bordering a stream coming
within federal control should be paid for the water power potentialities;
to do so would reimburse him for something not owned by him, or, as
Justice Douglas expresses it in the dissent, "give private parties an
entrenched property interest in the public domain, which the Federal
Power Act was designed to defeat."' 9 The policy expressed in this
argument and in prior cases 20 dealing with the effect of the commerce
clause on dam site condemnation appears to have been rejected mainly
because the licensee here had brought the condemnation suit in a state
court, relying primarily on eminent domain powers granted by the state.
The Court intimates that were the licensee seeking to condemn the dam
site by virtue of its federal license, value due to dam site adaptability
would not be an element of compensation.
Under the Federal Power Act, a licensee is granted the power of
eminent domain, and it is expressly provided that the power can be
exercised in the state courts or federal district courts, the practice and
procedure of the state where the land lies being followed as nearly as
may be if the proceeding is in the federal district court.2 ' This can
hardly mean that the state court can ignore substantive rights based on
federal statutes.22 Since the licensee relies on a federal statute, the
another point of view see Le Boeuf, An Industry Appraisal of Federal Regulation
of Electric Utilities Under the Federal Power Act, 14 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 174
(1945).
8 Bennett, Some Uncertainties in the Law of Water Rights, 21 So. CALIF. L.
REv. 344 (1948).
" See Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 69 Sup. Ct. 114, 122
(1948) (dissenting opinion). To allow the private owner without a license to be
compensated for the site taken on the basis- of its value as a hydroelectric site is
to allow the owner a benefit in terms of money which the Federal Power Act
denies him as far as actual use is concerned. Is such a "loophole" consistent with
the Act and the policy it represents?
20 See note 9, supra.
2141 STAT. 1074 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §814 (1946).
Proposed Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure No. 71A will provide a federal condemnation procedure superseding this provision if it is accepted. Proposed Rule to Govern Condemnation
Cases in the District Courts of the United States Prepared by the Advisory Committee oi Rules for Civil Procedure, 7 F. R. D. 503 (1948). There has been
consideration of such a rule before. The proponents claim that "it is better to
have a single procedure, even if it is not so good, than a lot of different procedures, which in themselves may be marvelous." Nichols, The FederalPower of
Eminent Domain, 4 FED. B. A. J. 159 (1941). The order of the United States
Supreme Court of December 29, 1948, authorizing the transmittal of new rules
of civil procedure to the Attorney-General for reporting to the present session
of Congress did not include proposed rule 71A. 93 L. Ed. 251 (1948).
"The question is not what happens in a federal district court proceeding
where such practice and procedure is to be used, but rather concerns an action in
a state court. Even if it has some significance in this case, recent decisions restrict the "practice and procedure of the state" provision to procedural matters
,nly, the federal and not state law governing the basis and measure of damages
since these matters arise under federal law. U. S. ex rel. and for Use of T. V. A.
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Federal Power Act, it would seem that it would have to be considered
23
since it is "the supreme law of the land."1

Probably the most equitable result would be to exclude any consideration of value based on dam site adaptability, but to reimburse the
condemnee for expenditures made in good faith.2A This principle would
be limited considerably, however, if land owners and hydroelectric companies could be presumed to know the effect of the Federal Power Act
on dam site value in condemnation proceedings and be required, therefore, to take it into account in transactions involving dam site lands.
The difficulty in applying this principle is the uncertainty caused by the
continually expanding definition of "navigable stream." 2 Actually,
most private power companies do not pay large premiums for dam site
adaptability in their condemnation of the land, so there seems no good
reason to reimburse them on that basis.20
A decision that a federal licensee need not compensate for dam site
value in a condemnation case would have the effect of stimulating private
power companies to develop dam sites and accept FPC licenses where
they have acquired the sites under state-granted eminent domain powers,
but have delayed plans for proposed dams because of the conditions
attached to the 50-year FPC license.27 Otherwise, they would run the
risk of a licensee taking the site under federal eminent domain powers,
the site being valued as farm or mountain land only.
These uncertainties ought to be settled. With 6,undreds of unlicensed
v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266 (1943); United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369
(1943); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 166 F. 2d 856 (C. C. A. 8th
1948) ; State of Nebraska v. United States, 164 F. 2d 866 (C. C. A. 8th 1947);
United States. v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land, 158 F., 2d 874 (C. C. A. 3rd 1946);
United States v. Johns, 146 F. 2d 92 (C. C. A. 9th 1944) ; accord, United States
v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). Contra: Central Nebraska Public Power and
Irr. District v. Harrison, 127 F. 2d 588 (C.C. A. 8th 1942). Dolan, Present Day
Court Practice in Condemnation Suits, 31 VA. L. REv. 9 (1944) contains an excellent discussion on this point. Also see Hitching and Claxton, Practice and Procedure in Eminent Domain Cases Under the T. V. A. Act, 16 TENN. L. Rw. 952
(1941) ; Fitts and Marquis, Liability of the Federal Government and Its Agents
foi Injuries to Real Property Resulting from River Improvements, 16 TENx. L.
Raw.23801 (1941).
U. S. CozsT. Art. VI, §2.
2" Hale, Value to the Taker in Condemnation Case, 31 CoL. L. REv. 1 (1931);
Steiner,
Eminent Domain Damages, 6 Mo. L. REv. 166 (1941).
5
Note, 19 N. C. L. Rav. 379 (1941) ; Comment, 39 Micir. L. Ray. 976 (1941).
The use of the term "navigable". to determine whether a river comes within Federal control under the commerce clause has served its usefulness and should be
discarded. It is a fiction now, for the Court no longer means "navigable" in the
sense of navigation or transportation, but means that the river is too important
to the commerce of the nation for an3; of a number of reasons to leave under state
,control.
I" This is because such lands are typically owned by many small land owners
when condemned and evidence of special adaptability for dam site development is
not admissible in the usual case. See Note, 106 A. L. R. 955 (1937).
27 Note, 19 N. C. L. Rxv. 379 n. 19 (1941).
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plants apparently within the scope of federal control,2 with many undeveloped power sites in private hands, with the absolute supremacy of
the federal power of eminent domain over persons and states,2 the vital
question of whether compensation is to include dam site adaptability
value should be decided. 30 If it is included, the public will have to pay
32
3
for it either in rates ' or on recapture after the end of fifty years.
But the principal case has not helped at all for it indicates that the
federal right involved may be recognized in a federal court but may be
ignored in a state court. In a dissenting opinion written after the
United States Supreme Court had affirmed the judgment of the Oklahoma Court, Chief Justice Hurst stated what must occur to all who
crave simplicity in the law: "I see no reason why the rule should not
be the same in both instances."' '
LEONARD S. PoWERs.
Evidence-Fornication and Adultery-Admissibility Under Statute
of Extrajudicial Confessions for Corroboration
The statute declaring fornication and adultery a crime1 concludes
with the following proviso: that the admissions or confessions of one
[participant] shall not be received in evidence against the other. The
statute has remained on the books in that same language since 1854,2
and the cases that have arisen under it are numerous. The interpretation given to the proviso had been regarded as well-settled-that it meant
exactly what it says. *Recently, however, the court went far toward
emasculating ninety-four years of construction in the case of State v.
Davis.3 Defendant, superintendent of an orphanage, and Lola Mae
Reeves, a fourteen-year-old girl in his charge, were indicted under the
statute. After the State had accepted the feme defendant's plea of noto
contendere, she was placed upon the stand where she testified, over defendant's objection, that she had had intercourse with the defendant on
at least six occasions during a certain three month's time. Marguerite
"1Gatchell, JurisdictionalProblems Under the Federal Water Power Act of
1920, 14 Gao. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1945).
"tDolan, supra, note 22, at 10; Recent Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 305 (1930).
" That it is no trifling matter is demonstrated by the principal case where the
difference in valuation of a little over 400 acres, with and without dam site
adaptability being considered, meant nearly a million dollars to the jury.
3141 STAT. 1073 (1920), 16 U. S. C. §§812, 813 (1946).
"41 STAT. 1071 (1920), as amended, 49 STAT. 844 (1935), 16 U. S. C. §807
(1946). The Supreme Court expressly refused to recognize these two factors as
having any bearing on the point.
" Grand River Dam Authority v. Grand-Hydro, 201 P. 2d 225, 235 (Okla.
1947) (dissenting opinion).
IN. C. GEN. STAT. §14-184 (1943).
'N. C. CODE c. 34, §45 (1854).
'229 N. C. 386, 50 S. E. 2d 37 (1948).
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Wooten, the orphanage matron, was allowed to testify that the ferne
defendant previously had made a similar confession to her. This, too,
was admitted over defendant's objection. Defendant was convicted,' and
on appeal he attacked the verdict and judgment principally on'the
grounds that the ferne defendant was rendered incompetent to testify
against him by the proviso in the statute, and also that the proviso was
disregarded to his prejudice in the admission of Miss Wooten's testimony. The conviction was upheld in a 4-3 decision, the majority being
of the opinion that the feme defendant was competent to testify, that
"the prohibition of the statute is directed not to the person testifying
but against the use in evidence of his previous admissions and confessions." It may be conceded that the case of State v. Phipps4 was
determinative of this point.
But then, after declaring the statute to inhibit the use of the extrajudicial confessions of one defendant against his co-defendant, the court
proceeded to hold that it was nevertheless competent to admit Miss
Wooten's testimony (as to the feme defendant's extrajudicial confession) for the purpose of corroboratingthe testimony of the feme defendant. This latter holding seems patently to ignore the language of
the proviso. The statute does not speak of purpose. The majority cited
two cases in support of its holding on this point, State v. McKeitwn 0
and State v. Gore,7 and while these cases admittedly support the bald
proposition that a witness's previous consistent statements are admissible
to corroborate his testimony on the stand (if restricted to this purpose),
neither case involved an indictment under a statute containing an inhibition similar to the one under consideration in the principal case. Hence
these cases are clearly distinguishable.
There are three possible explanations for the court's holding that the
use of such admissions and confessions is allowable if restricted to purposes of corroboration. First, in holding that the statutory inhibition
was directed not to the person testifying but to the use of his previous
admissions and confessions, the court admitted that such a construction
wras, in effect, to declare the proviso a mere codification of the general
'76 N. C. 203 (1877). After a nolle prosequi had been entered as to the
feme defendant, she was introduced as a witness against the male defendant. The
opinion, however, makes no mention of the statutory proviso under consideration
in the principal case. Apparently the general rules of evidence were held to be
controlling.
' Compare State v. Rinehart, 106 N. C. 787, 11 S. E. 512 (1890) (apparently
holding that the admissions or confessions of one defendant are not admissible
against the other defendant for any purpose) with State v. Roberts, 188 N. C.
460, 124 S. E. 833 (1924) (where admissions of the feme defendant were admitted because spoken in the presence of the male defendant).
6203 N. C. 494, 166 S. E. 336 (1932) (prosecution for procuring a person to
burn a dwelling house).
207 N. C. 618, 178 S. E. 209 (1934) (involved prosecution as accessory before
the fact of murder).
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rule of evidence which prohibits the use of such admissions and confessions as hearsay.8 But this "mere codification" idea gets out of- hand
when the court goes on to hold that the admissions and confessions of
one defendant are competent for purposes of corroboration simply because this is also the usual rule.9 Second, the holding might be justified
upon an examination of the theory behind the use of previous consistent
statements for purposes of corroboration. Such statements are available to establish the credibility of the witness, not as substantive evidence to prove the fact asserted in the confession,'0 and on this basis
it might be argued that they are not used against the defendant. But
this is pure theory. The practical result of such a practice is to use
them against the defendant if, without them, the witness will not be
believed by the jury." Third, the court in its haste to see justice done
might have felt the objection more technical than substantial. Since
the defendant could not show he was prejudiced by the testimony (how
could he ever show prejudice in such a case?), the verdict was not to
be overturned. But the statute is dear. If it has been disregarded, this
2
alone is reason enough to grant a new trial.'
JAmEs L. TAPLEY.
Insurance-Automobile Liability Policy-Scope of Loading
and Unloading Clause
The question of coverage afforded under "loading and unloading"
clauses, in automobile insurance policies has been a center of controversy
since the inception of such contracts.' The usual policy of this type
contains a liability clause for injuries sustained from accidents "arising
out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the vehicle, with "use"
further defined to include "loading and unloading."
In London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. C. B. White and Bros.2 the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia brings to focus the disputations
' Commonwealth v. Epps, 298 Pa. 377, 148 Ad. 523 (1930); State v. Allison,
175 Minn. 218, 220 N. W. 563 (1928); 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §1076 (3rd ed.

1940).
14

WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§1125-1126, 1131 (3rd ed. 1940) ; STANSBURY, NORTH
CAROLINA EVIDENCE §52 (1946 ed.).
10 STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE §§51, 52 (1946 ed.).
" Justice Stacy dissented vigorously in the principal case, saying pointedly that
the suggestion that Miss Wooten's testimony was not offered against the defendant
"has at least the merit of novelty."
"2Hooper v. Hooper, 165 N.: C. 605, 81 S. E. 933 (1914); Broom v. Broom,
130 N. C. 562, 41 S. E. 673 (1902) ; State v. Gee, 92 N. C. 756, 762 (1885) ; State
v. Ballard, 79 N. C. 627 (1878).
'For other discussions on this problem of coverage see Gibson B. Witherspoon,
What Protection Is Afforded Under the "Loading and Unloading" Clause of an
Automobile Insurance Policy?, 52 Com. L. J. 58 (1947) ; see Note, 160 A. L. R.

1259 (1946).

249 S. E. 2d 254 (Va. 1948).
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in which courts have engaged .with regard to these clauses. In the
instant case the plaintiff had contracted to deliver coal to the defendants
and used a truck covered by the described policy. The truck deposited
the coal at the curb, left the scene of delivery, and was some 100 feet
away on the return trip when a pedestrian on the sidewalk fell over a
lump of coal and injured herself. It appears that the coal was not left
on the sidewalk by the truck, but had been thrown there by employees
of the plaintiff who were completing the delivery by shoveling the coal
from where it had been dumped through an opening in the sidewalk into
the purchaser's coal bin.
The court, in determining whether this accident was covered by the
policy, could have followed either of two basic theories-the "coming
to rest" doctrine or the "complete operation" doctrine. The court chose
the latter, concluding that the shoveling was an integral part of the
unloading process. 3
Before liability can be imposed4 under either of the above theories
the court must be satisfied that there is sufficient causal connection between the accident and the vehicle used. 5 Generally the accident is held
within the scope of the clause if the loading or unloading was an efficient
factor, and in the absence of some substantial intervening force bearing
no direct relation to the truck this requirement creates no serious prob6
lem to the imposition of liability.

All courts profess to apply the usual canons of construction of insurance policies while considering those of the type in question. They
agree that the intent of the parties is to be ascertained, that if the words
are unambiguous they are to be taken in their usual and ordinary sense,
and that clauses indefinite as to their exact meaning should be construed
'London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. C. B. White & Bros., 49 S. E. 2d 254,

258 (Va. 1948).
In a majority of the cases the courts require that two questions be answered
in the affirmative before holding the insurer liable: (1) Did the accident occur
during the unloading?; (2) was the unloading the proximate cause of the accident? However, where the unloading creates the condition causing the injury or
starts the force producing the injury, it is not necessary that the accident happen
during the unloading to allow the insured to recover. Therefore it follows that
the answer to the second question ultimately determines whether or not there
will be liability.
'Maryland Casualty Co. v. United Corp. of Mass., 35 F. Supp. 570 (D. C.
Mass. 1940); Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 108
Utah 500, 161 P. 2d 423 (1945) ("must be some causal relation between the use
of the insured vehicle as a vehicle and the accident for which recovery is sought")
Handley v. Oakley, 10 Wash. 2d 396, 116 P. 2d 833 (1941).
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cassetty, 119 F. 2d 602 (C. C. A. 6th 1941) (Court
allowed recovery where person fell on coal which truck had dumped on sidewalk,
saying, "If the coal hadn't been unloaded, presumably she wouldn't have been injured."); B. & D. Motor Lines v. Citizens Casualty Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 486 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943), aft'd, 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N. Y. S. 2d
472 (1st Dep't 1944), inwtjon for leave to appeal denied, 268 App. Div. 755, 49
N. Y. S. 2d 274 (1st Dep't 1944) ; Wheeler v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,
292 Pa. 156, 140 AtI. 855 (1928).
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in favor of the insured.7 Since some of the courts approve the "coming to rest" doctrine and others approve the "complete operation" doctrine, it follows that the courts are either applying in different jurisdic,tions these canons of construction in different ways, or are allowing
some other factor to determine which theory they will adopt.
The "coming to rest" doctrine includes within the insurance coverage
only those acts comprised in the removing of the goods from the truck
until they come to rest, and until every connection of the motor vehicle
with the process of unloading8 has ceased. 9 It distinguishes between
unloading and delivery, 10 and stresses such factors as the time elapsed
between the unloading and the accident, and the actual relation of the
truck to the accident. The "complete operation" doctrine omits for all
practical purposes any distinction between unloading and delivery," and
holds that the policy applies at 2all times until the goods are delivered
to the place of final destination.'
While the distinction between the two doctrines is readily apparent,
logical bases to support each are not so apparent. The grounds supporting the "coming to rest" doctrine are pretty clearly spelled out in
the cases adopting it, but the reasons for the trend toward the "complete
operation" doctrine are not so obvious and merit examination. What
appeals to the writer as being the soundest of the theories which have
led a majority of the courts toward following the "complete operation"
doctrine can be briefly summarized as follows: The delivery of the goods
American Casualty Co. v. Fisher, 195 Ga. 136, 23 S. E. 2d 395 (1942). Cases
are not in accord as to whether "loading and unloading" is ambiguous. Compare
Bobier v. National Casualty Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N. E. 2d 798 (1944), with
Zurich Gen. Accident & Liability Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co.,
118 N. J. L. 317, 192 AtI. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
1 Both doctrines apply to "loading" as well as to "unloading." These two
aspects will be considered separately.
. Maryland Casualty Co. v. United Corp. of Mass., 35 F. Supp. 570 (D. C.
Mass. 1940); Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A. 2d
493 (1944) ; Stammer v. Kitzmiller, 226 Wis. 348, 276 N. W. 629 (1937).
A leading statement of the doctrine appears in Stammer v. Kitzmiller: "Where
the goods have been taken off the automobile and have actually come to rest,
when the automobile itself is no longer connected with the process of unloading,
and when the material which has been unloaded from the automobile has plainly
started on its course to be delivered by other power and forces independent of
the automobile and the actual method of unloading, the automobile may be said
to be no longer in use."
" St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 216 Minn. 103,
11 N. W. 2d 794 (1943) ; American Oil & Supply Co. v. U. S. Casualty Co., 19
N. J.Misc. 7, 18 A. 2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
"Maryland Casualty Co. v. Tighe, 29 F. Supp. 69 (N. D. Cal. 1939), aff'd,
115 F. 2d 297 (C. C. A. 9th 1940) (condemning distinctions between unloading
and delivery); Wheeler v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 292 Pa. 156, 140
Atl. 855 (1928).
" State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. District Court, 110 Mont. 250, 100 P. 2d
932 (1940); B. & D. Motor Lines v. Citizens Casualty Co., 181 Misc. 985, 43
N. Y. S. 2d 486 (N. Y. City Ct. 1943), aff'd, 267 App. Div. 955, 48 N. Y. S. 2d
472 (1st Dep't 1944), motion for leave to appeal denied, 268 'App. Div. 755, 49
N. Y. S. 2d 274 (1st Dep't 1944).
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to the purchaser is-the main purpose for having the truck, and such
delivery is but a step incident to the use of the truck and necessary to
accomplish its purpose. The parties intended the insurance to cover
accidents arising out of the use of the truck while accomplishing the
purposes for which it is owned, and therefore to provide coverage for
accidents incurred during the delivery.' 3
Whether or not this, and additional reasoning found in other cases,14
offer a satisfactory explanation for the doctrine remains, as is evidenced
by the cases, a moot question. It is believed that there are rational
objections to the "complete operation" doctrine. The reasoning under
it appears to permit no logical stopping place for limiting the liability
of the insurer. As long as the sometime tenuous requirement of causal
connection is satisfied, it would seem that delivery after "unloading"
cover most any distance and be facilitated by any activities reasonably
necessary to accomplish that purpose. The need for presence of or
physical connection with the truck and closeness in time between the
unloading and the accident bow to the policy of protecting the insured.
Recognizing the danger thus presented, most courts conclude that
each case must be treated according to its peculiar facts,'0 and thus
leave open an opportunity for "drawing the line" in cases obviously
demanding that, where otherwise the doctrine would apply.' 6
Although there are very few cases on the problem, the same divergent
views are expressed in construction of the "loading" clause. 17 One view
"3State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v. District Court, 110 Mont. 250, 100 P. 2d

932 (1940).
1, Some of the other reasons employed by courts adopting the doctrine are here
briefly mentioned. The court said in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cassetty, 119 F.
2d 602 (C. C. A. 6th 1941) that there appeared from the nature of the policy an
attempt to secure general coverage, and because of that it was unvise to apply
highly technical rules of construction. The value of this as shedding added light
on the problem is dubious. In Pacific Automobile Ins. Co. v. Commercial Casualty
Ins. Co., 108 Utah 500, 161 P. 2d 423 (1945) the court reasoned that the presence
of "loading and unloading" in the policy clearly showed that the coverage should include some accidents -when the vehicle is stationary, and that the parties would
be deemed to contemplate accidents happening during the course of delivery at the
time of making the policy. Therefore conformance with their intent would require that liability should be imposed for such injuries. In Bobier v. National
Casaulty Co., 143 Ohio St. 215, 54 N. E. 2d 798 (1944) the court considered the
phrase "loading and unloading" ambiguous, and since those were the words of the
insurer,
held they should be construed in favor of the insured.
1
American Oil & Supply Co. v. U. S. Casualty Co., 19 N. J. Misc. 7, 18 A.
2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1940). This is also the opinion of text authors. 7 APIPLEMAx,
§4322.
" Stating that cases must be so treated gives the court a loophole for not
applying the "complete operation" doctrine in situations which fall within its logical import, yet are so singular in facts that they demand different treatment.
This exception, for example, might likely be applied where the actual delivery of
the goods after the removal from the truck would require unusual methods, considerable time, and cover long distances.
17 See cases cited note 18 infra. Also see State ex rel. Butte Brewing Co. v.
INsuRAiNcE

District Court, 110 Mont. 250, 256, 100 P. 2d 932, 934 (1940).

19491

NOTES AND COMMENTS

regards all continuous acts in moving the goods from their place of
storage to the actual placing -of them on the vehicle as within the
policy,' 8 while the alternate view regards acts other than the actual
loading on the truck as merely preparatory and not within the scope of
the policy.19 Under decisions thus far reported it is difficult to determine just how much the courts will allow "loading" to cover. Again
such factors as uninterrupted continuity of movement, and perhaps the
time and distance involved, may well be factors of weight. It would
seem, whether dealing with loading or unloading, that before the truck
could properly be held as in "use" there should be a tangible relation between the truck itself and the goods.
In construing the phrase ".. . use..." as enlarged by "loading and
unloading" it is submitted that there is merit in the contention that
some courts have overlooked the fact that the latter clause is merely to
20
extend "use" and does not, at least in the absence of other factors,
purport to completely divest it of its usual connotation. It is believed
that the word "unloading" as generally thought of embraces only acts
closely connected with the lifting of the goods off the truck, and that
liability imposed for accidents lacking closeness in time and physical
connection with the vehicle infringes on the intent of the parties.'
The upshot of those cases which contravene the intent of the parties
will likely be the modification of insurance policies in order to obtain
decisions more in keeping with the usual meaning of the words "loading
and unloading." This could be accomplished by inserting in the insurance contract a definition of those words as the parties intend that
they shall be used.
Cnr.rEs L. FULTON.
Insurance--Loss Occasioned by False Pretenses-Coverage
Under Automobile Theft Policy
Where title and possession to an automobile are obtained by a swindler using a preconceived plan of false pretense, may the insured owner
" Washington Assur. Corp. v. Maher, 31 Del. Co. Rep. 575 (Pa. 1942).
Contra: Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A. 2d 493
(1944) (on very similar facts).
" Ferry v. Protective Indemnity Co., 155 Pa. Super. 266, 38 A. 2d 493 (1944).
"' Further explanations in the policy or a construction of the entire instrument might tend to expand the meaning of the phrase, as might an established
course
of dealing under the policy consistent with the enlarged interpretation.
"1 In Zurich Gen. Accident & Liab. Ins. Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co,
118 N. J. L. 317, 192 Atl. 387 (Sup. Ct. 1937) an employee under the usual policy
had taken milk off the truck and was putting it in an icebox inside a building when
an ice pick in his pocket injured someone. The court, in denying liability under
the policy, at page 319, 192 AtI. 388, said: "These words are plain and unambiguous, and delimit with understandable certainty the liability imposed upon the
insurer. They relate to the vehicle itself, and exclude acts that are only remotely
connected with its ownership, use, or operation."
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of the property so lost recover under a policy protecting against loss
from larceny and theft? Such a problem was presented in a recent case1
decided by the Supreme Court of Arkansas. There, the owner of an
automobile, who was induced to part with the car for a check on a bank
in which the pretended buyer did not have an account, was seeking recovery under an insurance policy indemnifying against loss occasioned
by theft, larceny, robbery or pilferage. The insurer resisted the claim
on grounds that the automobile was lost through an act constituting
false pretenses and that the policy did not protect the insured against
such loss. Held: Even if the swindler in this case is guilty only of
false pretense, still-under the Arkansas statute-such false pretense is
deemed to be larceny and insured is entitled to recovery.
The decision in the case commends itself as a sound result. As to
the reasoning of the court, in so far as it involves the problem of interpreting the coverage intended in the insurance contract, one cannot be
quite so sure. Indeed when one reads the cases upon this branch of
the American law he discovers little but chaos, both as to concrete decisions and as to reasons therefore.2
For convenience in analyzing the conflicting decisions involving an
interpretation of the meaning of the words "theft" and "larceny" as
used in an automobile insurance policy3 the writer chooses to present
them in two groups-(1) those appar~ntly placing a controlling emphasis
upon the label branded upon the crime committed thus giving to the
words their legal and technical meaning; (2) those cases holding that
the words should be given their usual meaning in the ordinary walks of
life regardless of the crime for which the wrongdoer could be convicted.
An oversimplification of the reasoning used by those courts falling
within the first classification in determining whether a given set of circumstances is within the risk contemplated appears to be as follows:
A has been deprived of his car. He is insured against theft. Theft and
larceny are synonymous, and, therefore, the insurer is liable to A only
if the act by which he suffered his loss is larceny as defined in our
criminal law.
Since the common law distinction between larceny and false pretenses still exists in the criminal codes of a majority of jurisdictions,
it naturally follows that most courts using such an approach, when confronted by the question presented in the principal case, have denied
I Central Surety Fire Corp. v. Williams, - Ark. - , 211 S. W. 2d 891
(1948).
2
Generally, see Notes in 14 A. L. R. 215; 19 A. L. R. 171; 24 A. L. R. 740;
30 A. L. R. 662; 38 A. L. R. 1123; 46 A. L. R. 534; 89 A. L. R. 465; 109 A. L. R.
1080; 133 A. L. R. 920; and 152 A. L. R. 1100.
3Unless otherwise noted, the decisions referred to in discussing both groups are
distinguishable from the principal case in that the insurance policies involved
therein provided for coverage against theft only.
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recovery, saying that since the owner in parting with the property intended to invest the swindler with the title as well as possession, the
latter has committed the crime of obtaining property by false pretense,
an act not contemplated, by the parties to the contract.4 On the other
hand, as in the principal case, recovery has been allowed in those jurisdictions wherein the act is deemed to be larceny. 5
Though usually in accord in applying rules of construction applicable
to insurance contracts in general, 6 there is little harmony in the results
reached in those cases apparently falling within the second of the writer's
classifications. Some say that "theft" is a broader and looser term than
"larceny" and therefore such a loss is within its meaning as used in the
policy. 7 On the other hand, others have concluded that "theft" as used
in an insurance policy has a narrower meaning and that such a loss is
not one fairly to be contemplated by the parties. 8 Thus recovery has
been allowed even in jurisdictions where the common law distinction
between larceny and false pretenses is recognized 9 and denied in another
where the two crimes are no longer distinguishable.10
It is submitted that the reasoning of those courts falling within the
second classification is the sounder, and, when properly applied, reaches
'Illinois Auto. Ins. Ex. v. Southern Motor Sales Co., 207 Ala. 265, 92 So. 429
(1922); Royal Ins. Co. v. Jack, 113 Ohio St. 153, 148 N. E. 923 (1925) (alternative holding); cf. Laird v. Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 2 Terry, Del.,
216, 18 A. 2d 861 (1941) (stock certificates); Cedar Rapids National Bank v.
American Surety Co., 197 Iowa 878, 195 N. W. 253 (1923) (bank theft policy).
'Brady v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Co., 47 R. I. 416, 133 Atl. 799 (1926);
Gaudy v. N. C. Home Ins. Co., 145 Wash. 375, 260 Pac. 257 (1927) (recovery
denied on other grounds) ; accord, Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Southern Surety
Co., 285 Mo. 621, 226 S. W. 926 (1920) (common law larceny).
'As a rule they agree that the policy should be interpreted in the light of its
nature as a contract of insurance, in view of its purpose as such, and with a considerable degree of liberality in favor of the insured and against the insurer by
reason of its having framed the contract, and that a risk fairly within its contemplation is not to be avoided by nice distinctions or artificial refinements in the use
of words.
'Hill-Howard Motor Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 111 Kans. 225, 207 Pac. 205
(1922); Overland-Reno Co. v. International Indemnity Co., 111 Kans. 668, 208
Pac. 548 (1922); cf. Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App.
D. C. 161, 117 F. 2d 774 (1941) (temporary larceny as theft coverage); Granger
v. New Jersey Ins. Co., 108 Cal. App. 290, 291 Pac. 698 (1st Div. 1930); Fidelity
and Casualty Co. of N. Y. v. Walker, 205 Ky. 511, 266 S. W. 4 (1924) (household theft policy) ; Toms v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 Ohio St. 39, 63 N. E. 2d
909 (1945) (temporary larceny). But cf. Royal Ins. Co. v. Jack, 113 Ohio St.
153, 148 N. E. 923 (1925).
8 Fiske v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., 207 Cal. 355, 278 Pac. 861 (1929)
(by implication) ; Delafield v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 477, 164
N. Y. S. 221 (1st Dep't 1917) ; cf. Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co.,
239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925) (temporary larceny).
'Hill-Howard Motor Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 111 Kans. 225, 207 Pac. 205
(1922) ; Nugent v. Union Automobile Ins. Co., 140 Ore. 61, 13 P. 2d 343 (1932)
(by implication).
* Delafield v. London & Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 177 App. Div. 477, 164
N. Y. S. 221 (1st Dep't 1917) ; see Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co.,
239 N. Y. 303, 306, 146 N. E. 432, 433 (1925).
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the more justifiable result, Such gaps as resulted from the niceties and
technical elements of common law larceny can be, and generally have
been, eliminated in the criminal statutes. The parties to a contract of
insurance should not be bound by any such artificial refinement. Unless
it is obvious that words which appear in an insurance policy are intended
to be used in a technical connotation, they should be given the meaning
which common speech imparts. The common thought and common
speech meaning of theft is that which prevails, not among lawyers and
judges, but among people, the great majority of whom have never heard
of any such technical distinctions. 1 The insured is purchasing protection against loss occasioned by an unlawful deprivation of his property and the insurer is in the business of selling such protection. If
the act by which the loss results is fairly to be contemplated within the
terms of the contract, giving to that instrument a considerable degree
of liberality in favor of the insured and against the insurer by reason
of its having framed the contract, recovery should be allowed, notwithstanding any label given the crime for which the wrongdoer may be
tried and convicted. The loss to the insured is present and real whether
the act of the swindler be technically "false pretenses" or "larceny."
Another consideration emphasizing the desirability of giving to the
terms their common thought meaning is the need for uniformity of construction of the insurance contract. Theft insurance policies are generally standardized. They are not limited in protection to the jurisdiction
wherein the policy is purchased. Theft in any other state is equally
within its terms. This, without more, is sufficient to forbid a reading
that would cause the risks to vary with the accident of local laws. 12
Neither insured nor insurer could reasonably have intended that the same
act would be theft within the purview of the contract if committed in
one jurisdiction but otherwise if committed in another. The prevailing
disagreement in the decisions as to the common thought meaning of the
terms is readily admitted; yet, it is beyond all reasonable expectations
to believe that uniformity is within the realm of possibility when contracts of insurance are construed in terms of the criminal codes.
As has been noted, the lack of agreement as to whether theft as
used in the contract is broader or narrower than larceny largely accounts
for the varying results in those cases emphasizing the common thought
meaning, and the presumption that they are synonymous terms is a necessary premise to any conclusion reached by those courts placing a controlling emphasis upon the label given the act committed. But, it should
1

Pennsylvania Indemnity Fire Corp. v. Aldridge, 73 App. D. C. 161, 117 F.
2d 774 (1941).
"Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E.
432 (1925).
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be noted that the cases referred to in either group have, in the main,
involved policies using only the term "theft" to describe the intended
coverage. The policy in dispute in the principal case, as apparently do
those in general use today, lists theft and larceny as coverages. One
may reasonably predict that the inclusion of both should result in more
uniform decisions granting recovery. No longer should it be necessary
to arrive at the intended meaning of the word "theft" in terms of its
relation to larceny and, therefore, the primary source of disagreement
should have been eliminated by the terms of the agreement itself. Only
in those states wherein the act proximating the loss in dispute is classified as larceny may one reasonably expect a controlling emphasis to be
placed uopn the crime committed in construing such a policy. It would
appear that the courts should concede that, in so far as theft is now
used in the policy, it is not restricted in its meaning to that of larceny.'3
Any such concession would necessitate an abandonment of the reasoning
applied by those courts heretofore denying recovery on grounds that the
act of the wrongdoer is "false pretenses" and the policy only protects
against an act amounting to "larceny." Those jurisdictions which have
previously held "theft" to be a narrower term than "larceny" and thus
denied recovery, even where under their criminal code the act involved
is larceny, should be expected to grant recovery where the policy itself
lists larceny as a coverage. It has been said that there is a growing
trend in the more recent decisions to rule more strictly against insurance
companies on the "theft" provisions of their policies."- In some of
these decisions, though the direct point in question was not involved, the
courts have taken cognizance of the comprehensive language of the new
type policy and abandoned older stands on the strength thereof.1 5 It is
submitted, therefore, that even those jurisdictions having previously
been confronted with the question under discussion and answered it in
favor of the insurer would not necessarily reach the same result in a
proper case brought under the comprehensive type policy now in general
use.
The only North Carolina case' 6 found involving a dispute based upon
the coverage provisions of an automobile theft policy did not involve the
21See M-ello v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 71 R. I. 510, 514, 47A. 2d 621, 623
(concurring opinion).
Baker v. Continental Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 26, 122 P. 2d 710 (1942).
,Compare Block v. Standard Ins. Co. of New York, 292 N. Y. 270, 54 N. E.
2d 821 (1944) (recovery allowed in temporary larceny situation), zith Van Vechten v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 239 N. Y. 303, 146 N. E. 432 (1925) (recovery denied). Also compare Toms v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 146 Ohio St. 39
63 N. E. 2d 909 (1945) (allowing recovery for temporary larceny), with Hoyne
, 69 N. E. 2d 153 (1943)
Ohio App. v. Buckeye Union Casualty Co., (1946)
14

(recovery denied).

"Hanes Funeral Home, Inc. v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co., 216 N. C. 562, 5 S. E. 2d
820 (1939) (temporary larcency).
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situation presented in the principal case; thus, one may only surmise as
to what may be the result when, and if, such a question is properly
presented to our highest tribunal. There is much in the language of that
opinion, however, that would permit one to reasonably conclude that
our court would follow the reasoning of those courts placing a controlling emphasis upon the label given the crime committed in reaching a
decision denying recovery. 17 Yet, there is nothing in the opinion indicating that the policy under consideration was the comprehensive type
policy purporting to protect the insured against loss due to "theft" and
"larceny." It is not, therefore, too much to hope that our court when
confronted with such a policy will recognize that "theft" as used therein
should be given its common thought meaning, perhaps that found in
Bouvier's Law Dictionary's where theft is thus defined:
"A popular term for larceny.
"It is a wider term than larceny and includes other forms of wrongful deprivation of property of another.
"Acts constituting embezzlement or swindling may be properly so
called."
CLARK

C.

TOTHEROW.

Recordation-Priority by-Title by Estoppel as Affected by
Timber land was owned by three brothers and three sisters as tenants
in common. One brother, without authority from the others, purported
to sell all the timber to the defendant by an unsealed instrument dated
November 15, 1946. On November 27, 1946, the sisters deeded their
interest to the three brothers, whereby each brother acquired an additional one-sixth interest in the land. On December 14, 1946, all three
brothers deeded the timber to the plaintiff, who had no actual notice of
the earlier instrument. On December 16, 1946, the defendant recorded
his instrument of November 15th. On December 18, 1946, the plaintiff's deed was recorded. Last, the deed from the sisters was recorded
on January 15, 1947. Plaintiff sought an injunction against further
cutting and removal of timber by defendant, to which the defendant
counterclaimed and sought specific performance of the unsealed instruments against the three brothers and their grantee. Held: The unsealed
instrument of November 15 was an enforceable contract to convey, by
which the defendant was entitled to the original one-sixth interest owned
by the vendor, but the plaintiff was entitled to. the rest of the timber,
" Theft is defined as larceny. Larceny is given its common law definition
including the requirement that the taking must be under such circumstances as to
amount technically to a trespass. Great emphasis is placed on whether or not the

act of the wrongdoer meets the common law or statutory requirements of larceny.
18 BouviER, LAW DiCTiONARY 3267 (Rawle's 3d ed. 1914).
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including the one-sixth interest acquired by the brother after he had
contracted to convey to the defendant.'
SECTION I-PRIoRITY BY RECORDATION

The court ruled thatwhen the defendant registered his instrument
"he thereby established his right to receive a conveyance of the onesixth undivided interest... even against a person thereafter2 purchasing
such interest

. . .

for a valuable consideration. ' 3

It is believed that such

language was inapplicable to the facts, since the plaintiff acquired his
interest before the defendant recorded.
Where A conveys an interest in realty to B and later conveys the
same interest to C, with C recording first, our court has uniformly held
that C has the better title, saying ". . . the one first registered will confer
the superior right." 4 Here C is the subsequent purchaser and the recording acts have almost invariably been regarded as intended to protect
subsequent purchasers and creditors only.5 Thus under the recordation
acts the grantor retains a power 6 to defeat his earlier conveyance, if not
recorded, by a subsequent conveyance to a second grantee. 7 This encourages prompt recordation. In North Carolina, even though C has
actual notice of the prior conveyance he will prevail. "No notice, however full or formal, will take the place of recording" and since B fails
to record, C is not put on notice.8 This oft-repeated and applied
phrase is intended to give sanctity to the recording statutes. The two
phrases last above quoted are of such common legal parlance that they
are often used to reach decisions in which clear analysis would compel
different results.
The instant decision demanded such clear analysis, where A contracted to convey to B, then conveyed to C, but B recorded prior to C.
Failure to grasp the distinction between this situation and the one above
mentioned where C recorded first, will lead to a trap into which some
Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 47 S. E. 2d 528 (1948).
supplied.
Chandler v. Cameron, 229 N. C. 62, 64, 47 S. E. 2d 528, 530 (1948).
'Combes v. Adams, 150 N. C. 64, 68, 63 S. E. 186, 187 (1908).
E.g., Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939); Glass v.
Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212 N. C. 70, 192 S. E. 899 (1937); Warren v. Williford,
148 N. C. 474, 62 S. E. 697 (1908) ; Wallace v. Cohen, 111 N. C. 103, 19 S. E.
892 (1892). As between the parties a conveyance is valid without registration,
e.g., Weston v. Lumber Co., 160 N. C. 263, 75 S. E. 800 (1912); McBrayer v.
Harrill, 152 N. C. 712, 68 S. E. 204 (1910); Leggett v. Bullock, 44 N. C. 283
(1853).
' Concerning the nature of this power, see Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L. J. 710, 756 (1916) ; Aigler,
The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 405, 415 (1923).
2 Italics

5

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§1262 (3d ed. 1939).

'E.g., Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939) ; Lanier v.
Roper Lumber Co., 177 N. C. 200, 98 S. E. 593 (1919) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37
N. C. 584 (1843).
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courts have fallen. The decision in the principal case is adverse to the
subsequent purchaser who was misled by the state of the record, caused
by the failure of B to record promptly. The court cites Combes v.
Adams,9 but in that case the subsequent purchaser recorded first, and the
holding was correct that the first recorded instrument took priority. It is
suggested that the court in the principal case could have bolstered its
opinion by citing several North Carolina decisions' ° in which strong dicta
appear to the effect that the subsequent purchaser must record first, to
obtain priority in this situation. While the dicta seem to require the
subsequent purchaser for value to register his deed before the prior
purchaser records his, such was the fact in each case, therefore these
are not square holdings that the subsequent purchaser would have lost
priority had this not been true.
In Builders' Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner,"1 as in the instant case, the
prior purchaser recorded before the subsequent purchaser. The Court
held that the prior registry should prevail, without citing any authority
to that effect, and without taking into account the considerations raised
in this note.
The North Carolina registration act is without any express provision
12
that the subsequent purchaser must record first to obtain priority.
The majority of courts with similar statutes hold their acts do not require a prior registration of the subsequent conveyance in order for it
to have priority over an earlier executed one."" Recordation statutes
-150
N. C. 64, 63 S. E. 186 (1908).
0

" See, e.g., Tocci v. Nowfall, 220 N. C. 550, 561, 18 S. E. 2d 225, 232 (1941);
Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C. 14, 19, 128 S. E. 494, 497 (1925); Sills v. Ford, 171
N. C. 733, 741, 88 S. E. 636, 640 (1916) ; Collins v. Davis, 132 N. C. 106, 111, 43
S. E. 579, 581 (1903) ; Maddox v. Arp, 114 N. C. 585, 588, 19 S. E. 665 (1894).
K1
182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921) (where first grantee in plaintiff's chain
of title, whose deed was prior in execution, registered his conveyance one day
after date of deed to first grantee in defendant's chain) ; accord, McHan v. Dorsey,
173 N. C. 694, 92 S. E. 598 (1917) (deeds filed simultaneously for record, one
prior in execution given priority).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. (1943) §§47-18 and 20. For a complete classification of
the statutes in the various states, see, 2 POMEROY, EQuITY JURIsRuDENcE §646
(5th ed. 1941).
",Steele v. Spencer, 1 Peters 552, 7 L. Ed. 259 (U. S. 1828) (construing Ohio
recordation act) ; Miller v. Merine, 43 Fed. 261 (1890) (construing Mo. statute) ;
Steiner v. Clisley, 95 Ala. 91, 10 So. 240 (1891); Brown v. Nelms, 86 Ark. 368,
112 S. W. 373 (1908) [contra: Glasscock v. Mallory, 139 Ark. 83, 213 S. W. 8
(1919); Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark. 256, 67 S. W. 398 (1902)]; Van Eepoel
Real Estate Co. v. Sarasota Mills Co., 100 Fla. 438, 129 So. 892 (1930) (where
mortgagee did not record apurchase money mortgage until after mechanic without
notice completed work, mortgagee was estopped to claim priority over mechanic's
lien, though mechanic's lien was filed subsequent to recording of mortgage) ; Feinberg v. Stearns, 56 Fla. 279, 47 So. 797 (1890); Randell v. Hamilton, 156 Ga.
661, 119 S. E. 595 (1923) ; McGuire v. Barker, 61 Ga. 339 (1878) ; Bank of Farmington v. Ellis, 30 Minn. 270, 15 N. W. 243 (1883); Craig v. Osborne, 134 Miss.
323, 98 So. 598 (1924) (where doctrine was clearly stated) ; Owens v. Potts, 149
Miss. 205, 115 So. 336 (1928) (while noting that Miss. by statute in 1924 amended
its recordation act so as to change the rule laid down in Craig v. Osborne, supra,
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of many states require priority of registry by express provision that a
conveyance is void against any subsequent purchaser "whose conveyance is first duly recorded." 14 Only three other jurisdictions' 5 have
been found which reach the result of the instant case without such
express wording in their acts.
A clear illustrative decision of the majority view above, where the
recordation statute is without such express provision, is Swanstrom v.
Washington Trust Co.,' 6 where the owner conveyed certain property to
the appellant on December 5, 1903. A portion of the same property was
conveyed to the respondents, for valuable consideration, on May 27,
1904. Appellant's deed was recorded June 10, 1904, and the respondent's deed was not recorded until March 7, 1905. The respondents
contended their deed had priority, because they were bona fide purchasers without actual or constructive notice of the prior and unrecorded
deed. The appellant contended that its deed had priority because it was
first in time and first recorded. Judgment for the respondents was
affirmed: "It is not necessary that the subsequent conveyance should be
recorded in order to gain priority, unless the statute so provides."
As pointed out by one author,' 7 "where through the neglect of the
first grantee to record his deed, a subsquent party has been led to part
with a valuable consideration, a race for registry between the two does
not afford a proper criterion by which their rights should be determined." Another author,' 8 commenting on the statutes requiring subsequent purchasers to record first to insure priority, notes that there is
the court applied the rule of that case because the transaction involved occurred
prior to the amendment); Sanborn v. Adair, 29 N. J. Eq. 338 (1878) ; Northrup
v. Brehmer, 8 Ohio 392 (1838) ; Turpin v. Sudduth, 53 S. C. 295, 31 S. E. 245
(1898) ; King v. Fraser, 23 S. C. 543 (1885) ; Ranney v. Hogan, 1 Posey, Unrep.
Cas. 253 (Tex. 1880) ; Nichols v. De Britx, 178 Wash. 375, 35 P. 2d 29 (1934) ;
Swanstrom v. Washington Trust Co., 41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 76 (1906). But cf.
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443 (1872) (after great deliberation and several rehearings court decided that its statute required the subsequent purchaser to record
first by express provision to that effect, but was fully cognizant of the opposing
view in absence of such provision).
" A typical statute of this type is CAL. Civ. CODE (1941) §1214, which provides: "Every conveyance of real property, other than a lease for a term not
exceeding one year, is void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee of
the same property, or any part thereof, in good faith and for a valuable consideration, whose conveyanwe is first duly recorded, . . ." Insertion of such a
clause does not solve all difficulty, see, Note, 14 CALiF. L. REv. 480 (1925).
"5Simmons v. Stum, 101 Ill. 454 (1882); Houlahan v. Finance Consol. Mining Co., 34 Colo. 365, 82 Pac. 484 (1905) (Colo. adopted Ill. statute, hence the
Ill. view was followed) (see AIGLER, CASES orNTiTLEs, 848 n. 17 (3d ed. 1942)
for criticism that the Ill. court has read something into the statute) ; Whitesides
v. Watkins, 58 S. W. 1107 (Tenn. 1900) (where court felt bound by its earlier
decision of Copeland v. Bennett, 10 Yerg. 355 (Tenn. 1837), though Barton, J.,
stated that if the question was an open one, he would be of the opinion that the
law was otherwise, giving a clear analysis of the problem).
1G41 Wash. 561, 83 Pac. 1112 (1906).
' 1 Wgaa, REcoRD OF Tirr §13 (1891).
5 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY 1276 (3d

ed. 1939).
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considerable force to the opposite view and that the statutory provisions
involve a departure from the theory that a purchaser is to be protected
from a prior unrecorded conveyance because he is in effect a purchaser
without notice thereof. Whatever may be the legalistic or logical arguments, it is believed that the intent and purpose of the registration acts
is to require such recordation as will provide public records, which may
be relied upon by parties about to acquire an interest in the property, to
indicate the exact status of title. 19 It is believed that the instant decision has just the opposite effect. The failure of the first purchaser
to record was a prejudice to the subsequent purchaser, who, by his
best efforts at the time of parting with valuable consideration, could
not determine from the record that the earlier conveyance had been
made. The first purchaser was not prejudiced by the failure of the
second grantee to record, since he had already parted with his consideration. To require a subsequent conveyance of title to be recorded
so that a prior purchaser of the same property may be able to obtain
information of its existence would not be in furtherance of the general
purpose of the registration acts, which is to protect those who are entitled to rely on the public records from being undone by prior secret
conyevances. The instant decision in effect writes into our recordation
20
statute the clause noted above.
It is conceivable that the present decision is an invitation to fraud.
Such might be the case where B fails to record until he hears that C
has just purchased relying on the record, and then beats C to the registry. If the court is faced with such a situation it might be induced,
by such a clear instance of the obvious injustice of its present view to
change its position to that of the weight of authority. This is especially
true in view of the fact that the considerations brought forth in this
comment have never been discussed and appraised by the court. The
usual reason given by the court for its result, namely to encourage
prompt registration, is unsound in this case, for B, whose failure to
record promptly caused C's difficulty, wins under this decision.
DAVID N. HENDERSON.
SECTION

II-TITLE

BY ESTOPPEL AS AFFEcTED BY RECORDATION

The scope of this section is limited to the one-sixth interest the
vendor acquired after he had purported to sell all the timber to defend29 For avowals of such purpose, see Grimes v. Guion, 220 N. C. 676,
679, 18
S. E. 2d 170, 172 (1942); Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 412, 196 S. E.
352, 355 (1938) ; Quinnerly v. Quinnerly, 114 N. C. 145, 148, 19 S. E. 99 (1894) ;
Blevins v. Barker, 75 N. C. 436, 438 (1876); Womble v. Battle, 38 N. C. 182, 190
(1844) ; Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584, 589 (1843).

" Supra, note 14.
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ant, which plaintiff claimed by a deed from vendor subsequent to his
acquisition of the interest. Plaintiff should have prevailed as to all
the timber since failure of the defendant to record until after plaintiff
21
purchased should give the latter priority, as heretofore pointed out.
The court overlooked that logic and, on the oft-repeated generality that
first on record is first in priority, ruled that defendant was entitled to
specific performance as to the original one-sixth interest owned by
vendor. However, in holding that plaintiff was entitled to the one-sixth
after acquired interest, it is believed the court failed to apply its priority
rule consistently.
Defendant based his claim to the after acquired interest on the theory
that one who purports to convey an interest in realty which he does not
own but which he later acquires is estopped to assert title thereto inconsistent with the conveyance. 22 Historically, the estoppel depended on
the presence of covenants of warranty in the instrument, the purpose
being to avoid circuity of action ;23 today, if any part of' the instrument
shows an intention to convey a certain estate the vendor is thereafter
estopped to assert he did not have title,2 even though he has no liability
on the instrument. 5 Apparently the present basis is analogous to
in that it depends solely on repreestoppel in pais,N but distinguishable
27
sentation within the instrument.
21

See Section I, supra.

E.g., Keel v. Bailey, 224 N. C. 447, 31 S. E. 2d 362 (1944); Shenandoah
Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Sandridge, 216 N. C. 766, 775, 6 S. E. 2d 876, 881 (1939);
Olds v. Cedar Works, 173 N. C. 161, 91 S. E. 846 (1917) ; Weeks v. Wilkins, 139
N. C. 215, 51 S. E. 909 (1903) ; Bell v. Adams, 81 N. C. 118 (1879).
22

For collection of decisions from other states see 58 A. L. R. 345-430 (1929),

supplemented in 144 A. L. R. 554-585 (1943).
2"BIGELOW,

ESTOPPEL, 423 (6th ed. 1913) ; McGehee, Estoppel and Rebutter in

N. C., 1 N. C. L. REv. 152, 153 (1922).

",Van Rensselaer v. Kearney, 11 How. 297 (U. S. 1850); Keel v. Bailey, 224
N. C. 447, 31 S. E. 2d 362 (1944) ; Woody v. Cates, 213 N. C. 792, 197 S. E. 561
(1938) ; Baker v. Austin, 174 N. C. 433, 93 S. E. 949 (1917) ; Weeks v. Wilkins,
139 N. C. 215, 51 S. E. 909 (1893) ; Taggert v. Risley, 4 Ore. 235 (1872).
RAwLE, COVENANTS FOR TITLE, 251 (5th ed. 1887).

,

BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL, 361 (6th ed. 1913); 4 TIFFANY, THE LAW

OF

REAL

PROPERTY 1230 (3d ed. 1939).
. "' Stevens v. United States, 29 F. 2d 904 (C. C. A, 8th 1928); N. C. Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Moss, 215 N. C. 445, 2 S. E. 2d 378 (1939); Finch v. Smith,
171 Okla. 307, 58 P. 2d 850 (1936); Masterson v. Bouldin, 151 S. W. 2d 301
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941); see Brinegar v. Chaffin, 14 N. C. 108, 110 (1831). But
cf. Cartwright v. Jones, 215 N. C. 108, 1 S. E. 2d 359 (1939) ; Jackson v. Mills,
185 N. C. 55, 115 S. E. 881 (1923).
Perhaps an important factor in the main case, although the court did not mention it, was that defendant knew the vendor owned only a one-sixth interest at
the time of the agreement. Furthermore, only the vendor signed, while the language of the instrument was "We do hereby sell and convey all. . . " It could
be argued that the vendor never bound himself to sell unless all his co-owners
signed. If the truth appears on the face of the instrument there is ordinarily
no estoppel. Gilmer v. Poindexter, 10 How. 257 (U. S. 1850) ; cf. Ayer v. Philadelphia Brick Co., 159 Mass. 84, 34 N. E. 177 (1893); Harmon v. Christopher,
34 N. C. Eq. 459 (1881).
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The instrument on which defendant sought specific performance contained all the necessary elements of a conveyance, except for a seal.28
It is well established in North Carolina that an unsealed instrument
otherwise adequate as a conveyance of land is treated as a contract to
convey and enforcible against subsequent purchasers with record notice.2 9 The court, relying on Corpus Juris, stated that the vendor, as
distinguished from a subsequent purchaser claiming under him, would,
by virtue of the instrument, be estopped to assert as against defendant
any title inconsistent with that he had contracted to convey.30 Although
certain writers have said that the doctrine of title by estoppel cannot
be applied to a contract to convey,3 1 it is believed the North Carolina
position is sound. The cases cited by these writers, and other cases in
which the principle was urged but not applied, can be distinguished on
the grounds that the courts were dealing either with void contracts or
those not purporting to affect title to realty.3 1 It is argued that the
extent of the estoppel is only to prevent the vendor from asserting a
title inconsistent with his purported conveyance, and the claim of an
after acquired title is perfectly consistent with a mere promise to convey.3 3

It should be noted that the language of the instrument with

which we are concerned was not that of promise, but of present conveyance.3 4 Furthermore, a contract to convey land is an actual conveyance of equitable title, 35 and specific performance is granted readily
in equity.3 6 In view of the close affinity of law and equity, it would
_8Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763 (1947).

22 Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763 (1947); Willis v.
Anderson, 188 N. C. 479, 124 S. E. 834 (1924) ; Vaught v. Willisma, 177 N. C. 77,
97 S. E. 237 (1918). Accord, Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co.,
227 N. C. 339, 42 S.E. 2d 218 (1947); Lumber Co. v. Corey, 140 N. C. 462, 53
S. E. 300 (1906).
The cases cited do not involve
20 66 C. J., Vendor-Purchaser, p. 1031 (1934).

contracts to convey.
21 PArN, TITLES §126 (1938) ; Lawler, Estoppel to Assert at;After Acquired
Title it Pa., 3 U. OF Prr. L. REv. 165, 167 (1937).
"2Harkness v. Underhill, 1 Black 316 (U. S. 1862) (contract void as against
public policy); Palm Springs Co. v. Palm Springs Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 2d 730,
98 P. 2d 530 (1940) (inadequate description); Harkins v. Hatfield, 221 Ky. 91,
297 S. E. 1109 (1927) (contract void as against public policy) ; Mass. Gas & Oil
Co. v. Go-Gas Co., 259 Mass. 585, 156 N. E. 871 (1927) (not a contract to convey) ; Oilphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218, 40 N. E. 980 (1895) (not a contract to
convey). See Bradley Estate Co. v. Bradley, 97 Minn. 161, 163, 106 N. E. 110,
111 (1906).
"2 Lawler, Estoppel to Assert an After Acquired Title in Pa., 3 U. OF PlTT. L.
REv. 165, 167 (1937).
"4"We do hereby sell and convey all the merchantable timber. . . . This
conveyance is made ...." Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N. C. 233, 41 S. E. 2d 763
(1947).
"Winston v. Williams & McKeithan Lumber Co., 227 N. C. 339, 42 S. E. 2d
218 (1947).
26 "While it is universally conceded that specific performance is a matter of
discretion, the best authorities agree that where a contract relating to land is not
objectionable legally, it is as much a matter of course for a court of equity to
decree specific performance as it is for a court of law to give damages for a
breach thereof." Stamper v. Stamper, 121 N. C. 251, 253, 28 S. E. 20, 21 (1897).
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seem only logical that the doctrine of title by estoppel should apply to
any instrument which legally or equitably affects title to land.3 7
In fact, there is good authority in equity for the same results as to
the vendor, without reference to this estoppel doctrine. The fact that
the vendor does not have title at the time he contracts to sell is no bar
to specific performance, if he perfects title before performance is due. 38
If we assume, as did the court, that the instrument would entitle the
defendant to the after acquired interest as against the vendor, the next
question is whether it will be effective against others. The theory that
title by virtue of the estoppel inures by operation of law must be considered in connection with the policy of the recordation statutes to
protect subsequent bona fide purchasers of land. North Carolina has
adopted the rule that subsequent purhasers from the vendor are not
bound unless they have record notice of the prior conveyance. 39 It is a
generally recognized principle that a purchaser is not required to search
40
the record beyond the time each vendor in the chain obtained title.
Obviously, as against subsequent purchasers, this rule defeats one
claiming title by estoppel if he records before his vendor obtains the
interest, since the record is off the chain of title.4 1 To prevail he must
record after the vendor acquires the interest and before the subsequent
purchaser records. 42 This is exactly our case. Defendant recorded nineteen days after the vendor acquired the additional one-sixth interest,
and two before plaintiff recorded his deed. On previous North Carolina holdings, as illustrated in this case as to the interest originally
owned by the vendor,4 defendant should have also prevailed as to the
" Allen v. Allan, 146 Ga. 204, 91 S. E. 22 (1916) ; Pring v. Swarm, 176 Iowa
153, 157 N. W. 734 (1916); Miller v. Miller, 283 S. E. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926) , Texas Pacific Co. v. Fox, 228 S. E. 1021 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); cf. James

v. Nelson,
90 F. 2d 910 (C. C. A. 9th 1937), cert. denied, 302 U. S. 721 (1937).
8

Nolan v. Highbough, 245 S. W. 146 (Ky. Ct. of App. 1922); Dennett v.
Norwood Housing Ass'n, Inc., 241 Mass. 516, 135 N. E. 866 (1922); accord,
McNeil v. Fuller, 121 N. C. 109, 28 S. E. 299 (1897); Hobson v. Buchanan' 96
N. C. 444, 2 S. E. 180 (1887); cf. Turnstall v. Cobb, 109 N. C. 316, 14 S. E. 28
(1891).
" Builders' Sash & Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921);
see Virginia-Carolina Bank v. Mitchell, 203 N. C. 339, 344, 166 S. E. 69, 71
(1932).
,0 Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 255 Atl. 670 (1903) ; Builders' Sash & Door
Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921) ; Truitt v. Grandy, 115 N. C.
54, 20 S. E. 293 (1894) ; Maddox v. Arp, 114 N. C. 585, 19 S. E. 665 (1894) ;
Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 136 S. W. 1047 (1911). Contra: Mortgage
Security Co. v. Fry, 143 Ala. 637, 42 So. 51 (1904) ; Perkins v. Coleman, 60 Ky.
611, 14 S. E. 640 (1890) ; White v. Patten, 24 Pick. 324 (Mass. 1837) ; Tefft v.
Munson, 57 N. Y. 97 (1874); Javis v. Aikens, 25 Vt. 635 (1853).
41

See note 40 supra.

,Semon v. Terhune, 40 N. J. Eq. 364, 2 Atl. 18 (1885) ; see Builders' Sash &
Door Co. v. Joyner, 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259 (1921); PATrON, TiasLS §45,
p. 46 (1938). If Section I, supra, is followed, he must record before the subsequent purchaser takes his interest.
43 Note criticism of this holding, Section I, supra.
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after acquired interest on prior recordation. Surprisingly, the court
found that the instrument, insofar as it related to this interest, was a
mere personal contract not affecting title to land and hence not within
the recordation statute. Of course, if the instrument was not within
the statute, recordation would not give notice. 44 But it did give notice
as to the original one-sixth owned by the vendor. The only possible
conclusion is that what made the instrument a personal contract as to
the one-sixth later-acquired was that it purported to convey an interest
not then owned. The only authority cited, and from which the court
apparently borrowed the term "personal contract," involves instruments
which do not purport to convey land and would not affect title to any
45
land whether or not the promisor owned it.

By the same reasoning, a deed or mortgage purporting to deal with
property not then held by the grantor would be a mere personal transaction and not within the recordation statutes. Obviously, if the case
is consistently followed, the whole doctrine of title by estoppel will be
destroyed as to subsequent purchasers, since it would be impossible to
give constructive notive by recordation, and North Carolina has repeatedly held that actual notice is inadequate. 4 A striking inconsistency
is that North Carolina recognizes the rule that where a mortgage contains a clause to the effect that any after acquired property will be subject to the mortgage, recordation of the mortgage is notice to subsequent
claimants. 47 Although the mortgage clause embraces property not
owned by the parties, the court has never referred to this clause as a
personal contract.
' Perhaps the court felt bound by precedent to follow North Carolina's
harsh rule of priority of recordation as to the share originally owned
by vendor, but was herein refusing to apply it to an after acquired
interest. Unfortunately, nothing in the decision, except the results, suggests any such dissatisfaction or limitation on the rule of priority.
The court affirmed a holding of the lower court that title to the
after acquired interest inured to plaintiff when the vendor recorded the
deed under which he received the interest from his sisters. The implication is that the vendor acquired title only upon recording his deed.
"'Black v. Solano Co., 114 Cal. App. 170, 299 Pac. 843 (1931) (contract to
sell potential personal property) ; State v. Kirsch, 78 Ind. App. 431, 136 N. E. 36
(1932) (contract with neighbor not to sell to competitor)'; Sjoblom v. Mark, 103
Minn;- 193, 114 N. W. 746 (1908) (contract not to sell liquors on land) ; Tremaine
v. Williams, 114 N. C. 114, 56 S. E. 694 (1907) (contract to cut timber) ; see
McAllister v. Purcell, 124 N. C. 262, 32 S. E. 717 (1899) (dictum that a faulty
acknowledgment would make registration void).
"See note 44 s-upra.
Turner v. Glenn, 220 N. C. 620, 18 S. E. 2d 197 (1942).
,7 Even though the recordation is prior to the acquisition of property by the
mortgagor. Hickson Lumber Co. v. Gay Lumber Co., 150 N. C. 282, 63 S. E.
1045 (1909).
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Unfortunately, language of similar effect has continued to creep into
North Carolina decisions 4 8 although the court has expressly repudiated
the idea when the problem was squarely presented. 49 It has been repeatedly said that an unrecorded instrument is perfectly valid and passes
title from the date of its delivery except as to subsequent purchasers or
creditors of the same grantor. 50 There are no such parties, i.e., grantees
or creditors of vendor's sisters, involved in this case, and as to all the
rest of the world the vendor had title from the date his deed was delivered. Apparently the confusion has grown out of the previously mentioned rule that a grantee is not bound by claims which are off the chain
of title, i.e., recorded before the grantor acquires title.51 But that does
not mean that a grantee can ignore the record prior to the time each
grantor in the chain recorded. Rather, he must take notice of the date
of the instrument under which his grantor took, which is presumed to*
be the date of delivery, and check for any claims recorded during the
interval when his grantor had title but had not put it on record.52 The
court should consider carefully whether it intends to change the law
that title passes on delivery of a deed and that outstanding liens or
incumbrances good on acquisition of title take effect at that point, and
to establish as law that this occurs instead at the time of recordation.
If the court intends any such radical change it should be done expressly,
upon clear analysis, and statement of adequate reasons. The present
practice of making occasional loose statements to that effect is introducing needless confusion into the law.
GEORGE M. McDERMOTT.
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Brock, 196 N. C. 24, 28, 144 S. E. 365, 367
(1928); see Cooper v. N. C. Bank & Trust Co., 200 N. C. 724, 725, 158 S. E.
408, 409 (1931) ; Colonial Trust Co. v. Sterchie, 169 N. C. 21, 23, 85 S. E. 40, 41
(1915) ; Note, 7 N. C. L. REv. 96, 98 n. 9 (1928). Contra: Linker v. Linker, 213
N. C. 351, 196 S. E. 329 (1938); Johnson v. Leavitt, 188 N. C. 682, 125 S. E. 490
(1924) (in these cases the attachment of the liens is upon acquisition of the property, not upon registration).
"oDurham v. Pollard, 219 N. C. 750, 14 S. E. 2d 818 (1941) ; Virginia-Carolina
Bank v. Mitchell, 203 N. C. 339, 166 S. E. 69 (1932).
ro Patterson v. Bryant, 216 N. C. 550, 5 S. E. 2d 849 (1939) ; Glass v. Lynchburg Shoe Co., 212 N. C. 70, 192 S. E. 899 (1937) ; Sills v. Ford, 171 N. C_ 733,
88 S. E. 636 (1916) ; Warren v. Williford, 148 N. C. 474, 479, 62 S. E. 697, 699
(1908), Connor, J.: "Defendant says that until the registration of the deed R. had
no title. This is a misconception of the registration act. The title vests as against
the grantor, and all others except 'creditors and purchasers for value' from the
delivery of the deed."
. See note 40 supra.
"' See note 49 supra.

